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INTRODUCTION

Consider the following situation: In late 2004, towards the end
of President George W. Bush's first term, the National Highway
Transportation Safety Administration ("NHTSA"), pursuant to its
congressionally delegated authority, promulgates a rule that would
relax inspection and testing regimes for automobile manufacturersthereby saving those firms substantial amounts of money-if the
manufacturers independently deployed cutting-edge vehicle safety
technology. The research and development of this technology will
require
significant
up-front
expenditures,
and
automobile
manufacturers must decide whether to invest the funds necessary to
bring the technology to market. However, the cost-benefit analysis is
not so straightforward. The predicament, as the automobile firms
understand it, is that this regulatory regime may not last long enough
to result in long-term cost savings. Several of the potential Democratic
nominees for the 2004 presidential campaign oppose this regulation,
and, if President Bush were to lose the election, the incoming
administration would possess the unilateral authority to discard this
new rule in favor of the previous status quo (or any other reasonable
arrangement).1 In light of this uncertainty, automobile manufacturers
rationally may decide to decline the offer implicit in NHTSA's new
rule and not invest in the costly (but socially productive) new
technology, frustrating the agency's regulatory aims.
Now consider the following situation: In late 2004, towards the
end of President George W. Bush's first term, a consensus emerges
1.

See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983).
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that poorly functioning markets have caused prescription drug prices
to spiral drastically out of control. While all parties agree that
something must be done, Congress-lacking crucial information
regarding the functioning of the prescription drug markets-is unable
to reach internal agreement on which policy to pursue. Confronted by
a technical issue about which they possess little expertise, a majority
of members of Congress decides that the best available legislative
option is to delegate authority to the Food and Drug Administration
("FDA") under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act 2 to take
steps to reduce prices, including the authority to impose price controls.
However, a large number of congressional Republicans, whose votes
are needed to pass this delegatory legislation, are willing to confer
such broad governmental authority upon the FDA only if they can be
assured that the agency will adhere to whatever regulations the
Republican-controlled FDA initially adopts. They fear the steps the
FDA might later take if it falls under the control of a Democratic
president. Uncertain about who will win the 2004 presidential
election, these members balk at handing such an expansive grant of
power to unknown future administrations. Thus, the problem of rising
prescription drug prices remains unaddressed.
What unifies these two hypothetical examples is the inability of
an administrative agency to convince a recalcitrant third party-in
the former case, a private regulated party; in the latter, Congress-to
take action necessary to accomplish the agency's regulatory mission.
In both cases, the agencies' difficulties stem from the simple fact that
they cannot credibly commit to consistent, stable policies. The
agencies possess no mechanism by which to assure the outside actor
that future administrations will remain true to the current agency's
regulatory choices. Just as market transactions would sputter if
parties lacked the power to write enforceable contracts upon which
they could then rely, so too is the administrative state hampered by its
incapacity to induce socially profitable reliance.
Scholars have long believed that flexibility-the ability to
adjust policies (and statutory interpretations) in accordance with
technological or economic advancements-is essential to the effective
operation of administrative agencies. 3 Consonant with this
understanding, over the past two decades the Supreme Court has
2.
21 U.S.C. §§ 301-99 (2007).
3.
See, e.g., Kenneth A. Bamberger, Provisional Precedent: Protecting Flexibility in
Administrative Policymaking, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1272, 1302 (2002); Yoav Dotan, Making
Consistency Consistent, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 995, 1004-05 (2005); Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E.

Hickman, Chevron's Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 912 (2001); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Reconciling
Chevron and Stare Decisis, 85 GEO. L.J. 2225, 2232 (1997); Cass R. Sunstein, Law and
Administration After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2071, 2088-89 (1990).
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afforded administrative agencies ever greater authority to adapt
regulations to changing circumstances. Agencies may shift policy
midstream 4 and are permitted to revise their interpretations of
ambiguous statutes-pursuant to the famous deference framework
enunciated in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc. 5-when a former interpretation will not accommodate a
novel policy. This progression towards greater flexibility reached its
high water mark in 2005 in National Cable & Telecommunications
Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Services.6 There, the Supreme Court held for
the first time that Chevron deference effectively "trumped" stare
decisis: If an agency is entitled to Chevron deference in its
interpretation of a statute, the existence of a prior judicial decision
will not diminish either the agency's entitlement to deference or,
crucially, its freedom to select a new statutory interpretation.
Agencies, and the public at large, have undoubtedly benefited
significantly from these enhancements in flexibility.7 But while courts
and scholars have occasionally remarked upon the harm that agency
reversals may do to regulated parties' reliance interests, the threat
that plenary flexibility may pose to an agency's own interests has
passed unnoticed. The consequences of the Supreme Court's latest
step will not be uniformly positive. By abolishing the settling effect of
judicial decisions, the Court has eliminated the only, albeit crude,
method by which Congress, a regulated party, or even an agency itself
could have fixed a policy or interpretation in place. Administrative
agencies thus have been stripped of the last remaining mechanism by
which they might have credibly committed themselves to a course of
policy and thereby induced skeptical outsiders to rely on the stability
of the governing regulatory framework.
As described in the examples above, the demise of this
administrative "safe harbor" likely will prove detrimental to agency
operations in two respects, both of which sound in a type of "contract
theory" of administrative law. First, an agency will have difficulty
convincing regulated parties to invest resources or take other actions
that may well be critical to the success of a regulatory initiative when
it cannot assure the private actor that the agency rule-upon which
these investments depend-will remain in place for an appreciable
amount of time. Second, Congress will be wary of delegating too much
discretionary authority to an agency whose regulatory decisions can
always be undone by future incarnations of the agency itself.
4.
5.
6.
7.

See, e.g., State Farm, 463 U.S. at 34, 42.
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967 (2005).
See Sunstein, supra note 3, at 2088.
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Congress's power to control agencies is asymmetric: it requires only a
simple majority to delegate authority but-assuming a presidential
veto-a two-thirds majority to revoke that authority and reassert
control. Brand X's extension of flexibility thus forces Congress to
gamble on the uncertain actions of all possible future agencies, as it
will have trouble controlling those agencies once it has delegated
power. Moreover, the value of this additional flexibility accrues
principally to future presidents, not to any one party to the current
legislative bargain. In combination, amplified uncertainty and this
externalization of benefits will likely result in Congress abstaining
from many socially worthwhile legislative delegations.
Thus, a mechanism is needed by which an administrative
agency could opt to signal credibly its intention to retain a consistent
statutory interpretation or policy in a particular case, without
generally sacrificing valuable flexibility in circumstances where
reliance is less important. This Article therefore suggests that
Congress consider passing legislation empowering administrative
agencies to create so-called "permanent regulations." Unlike a
traditional regulation, an agency could specify that elements of a
"permanent regulation"-certain
interpretations of a statute,
particular policy choices, or decisions at any level of precision-remain
frozen in place, unalterable by the agency once issued. An agency
would be capable of inducing hesitant third parties (including
Congress) to rely on the durability of its regulations when it deemed
such reliance necessary to the success of its administrative policy. And
it would be the agency-the institution trusted to make the correct
regulatory decisions in the first instance-who would control the
switch.
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I describes the
Supreme Court's trend-predating even Chevron-towards providing
agencies with ever greater temporal flexibility in policymaking and
scrutinizes the qualitative leap the Court took in Brand X. Part II
analyzes the difficulties that agencies likely will confront as a
consequence of their inability to commit credibly to a stable policy or
interpretation. This Part draws upon analogous insights relating to
credibility and reliance within the law of contracts. Part III then
suggests legislation affording agencies the option to promulgate
permanent regulations as a means of encouraging beneficial reliance
from hesitant third parties.

1026
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ADMINISTRATIVE FLEXIBILITY: TEMPORAL ADJUSTMENTS AND
JUDICIAL ENTRENCHMENT

Administrative agencies cannot function effectively if they do
not possess substantial discretion to set agency policy. Agencies exist
in large degree as institutional mechanisms for solving policy
questions whose intricacies and difficulties exceeded the capacities of
Congress itself. An agency that lacked the freedom to choose between
competing policy solutions or the flexibility to adjust its regulations in
the face of scientific or economic progress would be little more than a
rigid executor of Congress's will, stripped of the expertise that made it
an attractive repository of policy-making authority in the first
instance. Consequently, a growing consensus of administrative law
scholars has long favored granting agencies ever-greater authority to
enact policy changes in concert with developments in the relevant
8
markets and technologies.
Pursuant to this rationale, the Supreme Court has afforded
agencies broad authority to alter extant regulations or select new
policy courses. Under well-established law, an agency may discard a
long-standing policy in favor of a novel one, provided that it offers a
coherent rationale for its decision.9 And if an agency's current
interpretation of its empowering statute is not sufficiently capacious
to permit the agency to pursue this new policy, the agency may adopt
a reasonable new interpretation of an old statute without
relinquishing the deference that it is due under Chevron's famous twostep formulation. 10
Yet, in the two decades after Chevron, one significant obstacle
remained to an agency's ability to re-interpret ambiguous statutes and
adapt to changing circumstances. Until 2005, the Supreme Court
treated its statutory interpretation precedents-no matter the context
and regardless of whether they had involved an agency interpretation
and a judicial grant of Chevron deference-as absolute and decisive.
Once a court had interpreted a statute, regardless of whether the
agency had already had the opportunity to proffer its own
interpretation, stare decisis controlled. An agency could only reinterpret if a court had never passed on the original interpretation, or
if the agency could convince the court that the court had erred in its
original interpretation, without reference to Chevron.
In 2005, the Supreme Court eliminated this final impediment.
While deciding an otherwise mundane issue of statutory
8.
9.
10.

See sources cited supra note 3.
See State Farm, 463 U.S. at 44-45, 57.
See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 186-87 (1991); Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43.
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interpretation in National Cable & Telecommunications Ass'n v.
Brand X Internet Services, the Court announced that Chevron
henceforth would trump stare decisis: an interpretation of an
ambiguous statute that ordinarily would be entitled to deference
under Chevron would still receive that deference-and an agency
would be permitted to revise a prior statutory interpretationirrespective of anything that a court had ever said on the subject.
Ambiguous statutes had become forever ambiguous; no court could
11
settle their meaning.
A. Temporal Flexibility
Congress delegates power to agencies for a wide variety of
reasons. Congress may find it politically infeasible to make some
necessary decision because of significant negative political
ramifications, and as a result it might seek to foist responsibility off
on some other actor. Alternatively, there may be a faction within
Congress that hopes to accomplish via the executive branch what it
cannot achieve legislatively. 12
But Congress may also delegate power in order to harness the
superior expertise of an agency actor and to bring to bear on a problem
a set of scientific and technological knowledge and a breadth of
experience that Congress does not possess.1 3 In order for this
delegation to be successful-indeed, in order for it to be meaningfully
a "delegation"-it must afford the recipient agency some degree of
"substantive flexibility": the agency must have the freedom, when
analyzing the subject matter at the heart of the delegation, to choose
from among a range of acceptable policies the one that it believes is
best. Accordingly, the Supreme Court has granted administrative
agencies wide substantive leeway to select among competing statutory
interpretations-and thus among competing policies-via the familiar
two-step process set forth in Chevron, pursuant to which courts must
defer to reasonable agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes. 14
Moreover, courts and commentators have long realized that
agencies possess comparative institutional advantages over Congress
that surpass the mere application of expertise. By shifting
policymaking responsibility outside of the legislative branch, Congress
is also able to avail itself of the greater agility of administrative
agencies in responding to changed circumstances or adapting to new

11.
12.
13.
14.

Brand X, 545 U.S. at 982-83.
See infra Section II.B.
See Sunstein, supra note 3, at 2088.
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43.
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policy concerns. Legislation is costly and time-consuming to enact, and
Congress cannot always rapidly change course when confronted with
15
novel problems or the imminent obsolescence of old solutions.
Agencies are more willing and able than Congress to tweak their
policy agendas. Especially in the high-technology areas, this alacrity is
invaluable to agencies' ability to act in the public interest.
In order to act effectively, then, agencies must possess
flexibility not only in the substantive sense described above, but also
in the "temporal" sense: They must be free to alter policies over time
and adapt to changes in relevant technologies and markets. 16 Much
like substantive flexibility (deference, really), temporal flexibility
(which I will refer to simply as "flexibility") is the lifeblood of
successful agency operation. Even minor changes in technology or
markets can obsolete pre-existing regulatory regimes, and it likely
would be prohibitively costly for Congress to respond to every minor
17
circumstance by amending an agency's authorizing legislation.
Agencies need the authority to adjust policies in order to maintain
their currency and efficacy,1 8 and unwise judicial doctrines that deny
agencies all significant policy flexibility would undoubtedly lead to
regulatory stagnation. 19
In light of this obvious need, the Supreme Court has moved,
over the past two decades, toward affording agencies ever greater
regulatory flexibility. In its 1983 decision in Motor Vehicles
Manufacturers Association of the U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Company2 0-a case better known as a source of
agency constraint rather than empowerment-the Supreme Court
explained that an agency may switch policies as long as it explains
and justifies the move, noting that agencies "must be given ample
15. This is not even to speak of the fact that Congress may not realize that such problems
exist for the same reason that it delegates in the first place: it lacks the expertise to comprehend
the fine-grained nature of a problem or the fact that an extant regulatory response has become
inadequate.
16. Substantive and temporal flexibility are of course simply two dimensions of the same
phenomenon.
17. See Sunstein, supra note 3, at 2088 ("New developments involving technological
capacity, economics, the international situation, or even law may affect regulatory performance.
Congress is unable to amend every statute to account for these changes ...[and] administrators
are in a far better position than courts to interpret ambiguous statutes in a way that takes
account of new conditions.").
18. Maislin Indus., U.S., Inc. v. Primary Steel, Inc., 497 U.S. 116, 134 (1990) ("[T]he
Commission has both the authority and expertise generally to adopt new policies when faced
with new developments in the industry."); NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251, 266 (1975)
("The responsibility to adapt the Act to changing patterns of industrial life is entrusted to the
Board.").
19. See Bamberger, supra note 3, at 1302.
20. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
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latitude to 'adapt their rules and policies to the demands of changing
circumstances.' "21 As State Farm concerned the logic behind a policy
choice, not whether that policy was consistent with the delegatory
statute, the type of policy change at issue was one that the agency
could legally make within the confines of a single statutory
interpretation.
A year later the Court extended this framework, holding in
Chevron that it would not deny deference to an agency's statutory
interpretation merely because that interpretation conflicted with prior
agency policy. 22 The Court thus sanctioned shifts between alternative,
reasonable statutory interpretations. This move was a natural
outgrowth of the principles that underscored Chevron itself: Once
statutes are conceived of as delegations of policymaking authority,
rather than rigid textual commands, it is logical to permit an agency
to shift "statutory" policies, just as it was permitted under State Farm
23
to shift policies within the confines of a single statutory meaning.
For several decades after Chevron the Court vacillated on this
pro-flexibility stance, occasionally indicating that a novel agency
interpretation deserves less deference. 24 On other occasions, however,
the Court reiterated (counterfactually) that it "ha[d] rejected the
argument that an agency's interpretation 'is not entitled to deference
because it represents a sharp break with prior interpretations.' "25

21. Id. at 42 (quoting In re Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 784 (1968)). The
Court nonetheless displayed a minor preference for stable administrative policies and refused to
treat alterations in agency rules as equivalent to the establishment of new rules: "[An agency
changing its course by rescinding a rule," explained the Court, "is obligated to supply a reasoned
analysis for the change beyond that which may be required when an agency does not act in the
first instance." Id.
22. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 863-64 (1984).
There was no judicial interpretation of the Clean Air Act's "stationary source" language
predating Chevron, which is why the Brand X question remained unaddressed.
23. See Dotan, supra note 3, at 1033 ("The Court introduced the presumption that statutory
ambiguity reflects congressional intent to delegate interpretive power to administrative agencies,
discarding the distinction between interpretation and policymaking."); Sunstein, supra note 3, at
2093, 2103.
24. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 446 n.30 (1987) ("An agency interpretation of
a relevant provision which conflicts with the agency's earlier interpretation is 'entitled to
considerably less deference' than a consistently held agency view." (quoting Watt v. Alaska, 451
U.S. 259, 273 (1981))); see also Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 515 (1994); Good
Samaritan Hosp. v. Shalala, 508 U.S. 402, 417 (1993); Pauley v. BethEnergy Mines, Inc., 501
U.S. 680, 698 (1991); Mullins Coal Co. v. Dir., Office of Workers' Comp. Programs, U.S. Dep't of
Labor, 484 U.S. 135, 159-60 (1987); Dotan, supra note 3, at 1025.
25. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 186 (1991) (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 862). The Rust
Court noted, consistent with its Chevron jurisprudence, "[aln agency is not required to establish
rules of conduct to last forever, but rather must be given ample latitude to adapt its rules and
policies to the demands of changing circumstances." Rust, 500 U.S. at 186-87 (citations omitted);
see also FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 156-57 (2000); Smiley v.
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Nevertheless, by 2005 it appeared to be relatively settled law that
fluctuations in an agency's positions did not affect Chevron deference,
and thus an agency could adjust regulations over time without
26
sacrificing its valuable entitlement to deference.
B. Chevron and Stare Decisis
Despite the broad grants of temporal flexibility bestowed upon
agencies in State Farm and Chevron, as late as 2005 there remained
one significant obstacle to agencies' ability to adjust and adapt policies
over time. The stare decisis effect of a judicial decision regarding even
an ambiguous statute's meaning-whether the court was merely
ratifying an interpretation proffered by an agency (pursuant to
Chevron) or undertaking its own de novo statutory interpretationserved to entrench that statutory meaning. Once an agency had been
taken to court, it would be effectively stripped of the ability to revisit
its statutory interpretation. It was this last barrier that the Supreme
Court confronted in Brand X.
1. The Supremacy of Judicial Precedent
As one might expect of any decision of its magnitude, Chevron
left many important questions in its wake.2 7 These issues ranged from
the self-evidently crucial 28 to the apparently mundane, 29 and many of
Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 742 (1996); Dotan, supra note 3, at 1027 n.110 (collecting
cases).
26. One scholar has proposed that the most sensible way to rationalize the courts' back-andforth pronouncements on the question was through an examination of the procedures employed
by an agency in arriving at its most recent interpretation. See Dotan, supra note 3, at 1029,
1043-46. A court should award deference, according to Professor Dotan, if and only if an agency
arrived at its newer interpretation pursuant to procedures that are at least as formal and as
general (meaning that they resemble a rulemaking, rather than an adjudication) as the
procedures from which the previous interpretation derived. See id. at 1030-46. This is an
interesting approach but one that is largely orthogonal to the present issue. After United States
v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001), and Brand X, the vast majority of new statutory
interpretations that can command Chevron deference and override a prior judicial
pronouncement-and especially the vast majority of interpretations that announce significant
policy shifts and thus form the core concern of this Article-will come via notice-and-comment
rulemaking.
27. See generally Merrill & Hickman, supra note 3.
28. For instance, the question of which agency interpretations were entitled to Chevron
deference remained. See, e.g., United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229-31 (2001) (holding
that a U.S. Customs Service ruling was not entitled to Chevron deference); Christensen v. Harris
County, 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000) (holding that opinion letters are not entitled to Chevron
deference).
29. Merrill and Hickman catalogue fourteen questions of varying degrees of importance,
including such relatively banal issues as whether Chevron applies to "cross-referenced statutes,
as when a general statute cross-references a statute that an agency is charged with
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them involved the interaction between Chevron deference and
traditional judicial mechanisms of statutory interpretation, such as
31
statutory canons 30 and, of greatest relevance here, stare decisis.
These latter issues of statutory interpretation would appear to concern
only the level of deference (meaning substantive flexibility) that an
agency will receive. They apply most obviously to the question of when
a court will find a statute unambiguous at Chevron's Step One, and
thus to the issue of when an agency's interpretation will stand.
But the relationship between stare decisis and Chevron
deference has importance far outstripping its impact upon the
interpretation of particular statutes as ambiguous or unambiguous.
Stare decisis is, of course, a temporal phenomenon: A first case is
decided at some moment in time, and the result in that case binds
subsequent outcomes. Consequently, if stare decisis were to function
in typical fashion, Chevron notwithstanding, every extant judicial
decision would curtail an agency's temporal flexibility. A judicial
interpretation of a statute-whether or not that initial interpretation
was the agency's to which the earlier court had deferred 32-would
effectively fix the meaning of that statute in place, binding an agency
until either Congress chose to amend the statute or the court agreed
to overturn its prior holding.
Imagine, for instance, an agency that decides to initiate a
rulemaking process pursuant to an empowering statute. The agency
issues a rule (that necessarily involves interpreting some portion of
the governing statute) and third parties immediately challenge the
rule. Assume that a court holds that the statute is ambiguous, defers
to the agency under Chevron, and upholds the agency's statutory
interpretation. Under a rigid stare decisis regime, this statutory
interpretation would be cast in stone; the agency would not later be
able to amend its interpretation and pursue an alternative policy
course without convincing the court to overturn its prior ruling.
In view of the many questions of statutory construction the
Supreme Court has already addressed and decided, this would be no
small constraint; stare decisis would place a significant swath of

administering, or when a statute an agency is charged with administering cross-references a
general statute or general principles of common law." Merrill & Hickman, supra note 3, at 84952.
30. See Russell L. Weaver, Some Realism About Chevron, 58 Mo. L. REV. 129, 162 & n.223
(1993).
31. Merrill & Hickman, supra note 3, at 852; Pierce, supra note 3.
32. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 863-84 (1984);
Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 136-37, 140 (1944).
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administrative law beyond the reach of agency alteration.3 3 Such a
rigid approach to stare decisis could result in an "ossification" of
regulatory policymaking on a scale rivaling that of doctrines (such as
hard look review) that are traditionally blamed for inducing such
34
paralysis.
The impact of stare decisis upon agencies' temporal flexibility
revolves crucially around courts' treatment of ambiguous statutesthose statutes that would normally trigger agency deference at
Chevron's Step One. Recall that if a court determines that a statute is
unambiguous, the agency is entitled to no deference and thus no
flexibility. 35 Under those circumstances, the court determines the
meaning of the statute 36 and this judicial construction is subject to the
stare decisis in the same manner as any other legal decision.3 7 But if a
statute is ambiguous, a court must afford deference to a valid agency
interpretation and must allow the agency the flexibility to adjust its
interpretation over time 3 8 -stare decisis trumps Chevron, in which
case a pre-existing judicial decision would lock a statute's
interpretation in place.
In the aftermath of Chevron, the Supreme Court appeared to
signal that judicial precedent-or at least its own judicial precedentwould indeed override both an agency's right to Chevron deference and

33. The set of significant cases that the Supreme Court and lower courts have decided in
the agency's favor pursuant to Chevron deference is indeed vast; for a small sampling of the most
momentous Supreme Court cases, see, e.g., Utah v. Evans, 536 U.S. 452 (2002) (congressional
reapportionment); Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212 (2002) (eligibility for Social Security
Disability payments); Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev. v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125 (2002) (public
housing evictions); New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1 (2002) (open access to electric transmission
lines); United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997) (insider trading rules); PUD No. 1 of
Jefferson County v. Wash. Dep't. of Ecology, 511 U.S. 700 (1994) (state clean water regulation);
Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991) (family planning gag rule); United States v. Riverside
Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121 (1985) (jurisdiction to regulate water pollution under the
Clean Water Act).
34. See, e.g., STEPHEN G. BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK
REGULATION 48 (1993); JERRY L. MASHAW & DAVID L. HARFST, THE STRUGGLE FOR AUTO SAFETY
225-55 (1990); Thomas 0. McGarrity, The Courts and the Ossification of Rulemaking. A Response
to Professor Seidenfeld, 75 TEX. L. REV. 525, 533-36 (1997); Thomas 0. McGarity, Some Thoughts
on "Deossifying" the Rulemaking Process, 41 DUKE L.J. 1385, 1419, 1444 (1992); Richard J.
Pierce, Jr., The APA and Regulatory Reform, 10 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 81, 82-83 (1996)
35. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43.
36. Id.
37. This is not to mention the fact that courts have typically treated stare decisis as a more
rigid command when interpreting statutes than when interpreting a constitution under the
assumption that Congress has the ability to correct the court's interpretation of the former in the
event that it disagrees with it. Hilton v. S.C. Pub. Rys. Comm'n, 502 U.S. 197, 202 (1991)
("Considerations of stare decisis have special force in the area of statutory interpretation, for
here, unlike in the context of constitutional interpretation, the legislative power is implicated,
and Congress remains free to alter what we have done." (citation omitted)).
38. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843, 864.
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its concomitant ability to shift statutory interpretations over time. In
a series of four cases, the Court consistently refused to permit an
agency to alter its interpretation of a statute where the Court had
previously spoken to the question of statutory interpretation at
hand. 39 Moreover, though the opinions are opaque in important
respects, in none of these cases did the result appear to hinge on the
Court having previously held the statutes at issue to be unambiguous.
On the contrary, the Supreme Court extended the dominance of stare
decisis to ambiguous statutes whose constructions would be otherwise
subject to Chevron deference.
The first of these four cases, Golden State Transit Corporation
v. Los Angeles, 40 is also the Court's most explicit statement on the
subject. In Golden State, the agency's statutory interpretation
normally would have been entitled to Chevron deference were it
reaching the Court for the first time. 41 Nonetheless, the Supreme
Court announced that it would adhere to its contrary precedent, the
relevant statute's admitted ambiguity notwithstanding:
A rule of law that is the product of judicial interpretation of a vague, ambiguous, or
incomplete statutory provision is no less binding than a rule that is based on the plain
meaning of a statute. The violation of a federal right that has been found to be implicit
in a statute's language and structure is as much a "direct violation"
of a right as is the
42
violation of a right that is clearly set forth in the text of the statute.

Several years later, in Neal v. United States,43 the Court
confirmed this view:
In these circumstances, we need not decide what, if any, deference is owed the
Commission in order to reject its alleged contrary interpretation. Once we have
determined a statute's meaning, we adhere to our ruling under the doctrine of stare
decisis,
and we assess an agency's later interpretation of the statute against that settled
4
law.

4

On two other occasions the Supreme Court's explanation of the
operative rule has been substantially less unequivocal. At first glance,
Maislin Industries, U.S., Inc v. Primary Steel, Inc. 45 and Lechmere, Inc
v. NLRB 46 support a distinction between the precedential effect of a
holding that rests on a statute's lack of ambiguity and a pre-Chevron
judicial interpretation of an ambiguous statute. In Maislin, the
Supreme Court wrote, "[o]nce we have determined a statute's clear

39.

RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 3.6, at 184-85 (4th ed. 2002).

40.
41.
42.
43.

Golden State Transit Corp. v. Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 103 (1989).
Pierce, supra note 3, at 2248-49.
Golden State, 493 U.S. at 112.
Neal v. United States, 516 U.S. 294 (1996).

44.

Id. at 295.

45.
46.

Maislin Indus., U.S., Inc. v. Primary Steel, Inc., 497 U.S. 116 (1990).
Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527 (1992).
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meaning, we adhere to that determination under the doctrine of stare
decisis, and we judge an agency's later interpretation of the statute
against our prior determination of the statute's meaning." 47 The
Court's explanation is heavy with the negative pregnant; if the statute
is ambiguous, stare decisis may hold no purchase on the agency. But
49
4s
the decisions that predated and constrained Maislin and Lechmere
hardly involved unambiguous statutes,5 0 much less statutes that the
Supreme Court had already held unambiguous (recall that stare
decisis only operates meaningfully if the prior decision has determined
that the statutory meaning is clear). 51 For example, the statutory
question at issue in Lechmere was whether a store owner's decision to
prohibit the distribution of union literature in the store's parking lot
constituted an "unfair labor practice" that "interfere[d] with,
restrain[ed], or coerce[d] employees. ' 52 As one commentator noted, the
Court's decision "may be good public policy" but surely does not
53
represent the statute's only possible meaning.
As of 2005, then, the weight of authority appeared to favor the
view that stare decisis trumped an agency's entitlement to Chevron
deference and to temporal flexibility, 54 though this point was not
without controversy. 55 The Court's position was one of immoderate
anti-skepticism; it believed in its own power to settle a law's meaning,
irrespective of inherent ambiguity. In the words of Judge Kozinski,

47. Maislin, 497 U.S. at 131 (emphasis added); see also Lechmere, 502 U.S. at 536-37.
48. See Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Maxwell, 237 U.S. 94 (1915); Tex. & Pac. Ry. Co.
v. Mugg, 202 U.S. 242 (1906); Gulf, Colo. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Hefley, 158 U.S. 98, 101 (1895).
49. See NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105 (1956).
50. See Pierce, supra note 3, at 2249-50.
51. After all, these earlier decisions predated Chevron. The Court therefore had had no
reason to announce whether its constructions were mandated by the statutory language or were
merely the best interpretations-the distinction was irrelevant.
52. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (2007); Lechmere, 502 U.S. at 531-32.
53. See Pierce, supra note 3, at 2249.
54. It is worth noting that the Supreme Court did not treat circuit court precedent in the
same fashion, granting Chevron deference to agencies and overruling inconsistent circuit court
precedent on several occasions. See, e.g., Sutton v. United Air Lines, 527 U.S. 471 (1999); Cent.
Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank, 511 U.S. 164 (1994). This discrepancy is most likely due
to the fact that the Supreme Court is not bound by circuit precedent, rather than anything
inherent to the relative values of Chevron deference and circuit court precedent.
55. The majority of contemporary scholarly commentary seemed to support the notion that
stare decisis trumped Chevron deference before Brand X. See Bamberger, supra note 3, at 129394; Pierce, supra note 3, at 2251 ("[The Supreme Court has created a simple, mechanical, rule,
strictly adhered to by the lower courts, that its own precedents must prevail over Chevron's
command."); Gregg D. Polsky, Can Treasury Overrule the Supreme Court?, 84 B.U. L. REV. 185,
202 (2004); Paul A. Dame, Note, Stare Decisis, Chevron, and Skidmore: Do Administrative
Agencies Have the Power to Overrule Courts?, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 405, 424 (2002); see also
Merrill & Hickman, supra note 3, at 915-17.
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Statutory meaning is not a matter of hopes or wishes; it is a fact. In settling on a
particular interpretation of a statute, the court is saying: "This is the meaning that was
actually conferred upon this statute by Congress." ... A change in the agency's view...
may motivate a reviewing court to reconsider the soundness of its prior interpretation.
cannot automatically alter the meaning Congress
But a change in an agency's position
56
gave the statute years earlier.

Crucially, this anti-skeptical position seemed to apply
regardless of whether, in the prior existing precedent, the court had
offered its own interpretation of an ambiguous statute or merely
57
ratified an agency's interpretation (pursuant to Chevron deference).
Stare decisis served to entrench both judicial and agency
interpretations, ensconcing whichever institutional view happened to
make its way into court first. It was this view of precedent that the
Court undertook to reconsider in BrandX.
2. Brand X and the Dominance of Agency Interpretation
Brand X arose from a ruling by the FCC-pursuant to
delegated notice-and-comment rulemaking authority-that cable
television companies that provided broadband internet service (socalled "cable modem service") were not offering a "telecommunications
service" and thus were not subject to mandatory regulation under
Title II of the Telecommunications Act.58 This otherwise quotidian
issue of statutory interpretation and Chevron deference was
complicated by the fact that the Ninth Circuit had in an earlier case,
AT&T Corp. v. Portland,59 interpreted the statutory phrase
"telecommunications service" to include cable modem internet service,
contradicting the FCC's subsequent interpretation at issue in Brand
X. Critically, the Ninth Circuit in Portland had not found the key
statutory language unambiguous, though neither had it arrived at its
statutory interpretation after granting Chevron deference to the
agency's view. Rather, in Portland the FCC had "declined, both in its
regulatory capacity and as amicus curiae, to address the issue,"
forcing the Ninth Circuit to undertake a de novo interpretation of the
statute. Pursuant to this pre-existing interpretation, in Brand X the
Ninth Circuit concluded that Portland's stare decisis effect trumped
56. Mesa Verde Const. Co. v. N. Cal. Dist. Council of Laborers, 861 F.2d 1124, 1147 (9th
Cir. 1988) (en banc) (Kozinski, J., dissenting), replaced by 895 F.2d 816 (9th Cir. 1990).
57. No case is explicit on this point, but neither do they make any distinction with respect
to the source of the prior interpretation granted stare decisis effect. See supra text accompanying
notes 39-52 and cases cited therein. The most logical interpretation is that the Court intended
stare decisis to operate across the board; indeed, the case for applying stare decisis is, if
anything, stronger when the relevant agency has already availed itself of one opportunity to
interpret a delegatory statute.
58. Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 973-74 (2005).
59. AT&T Corp. v. Portland, 216 F.3d 871 (9th Cir. 2000).
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the agency's right to Chevron deference and controlled the case, and
held that the court's prior interpretation of the statutory language
must prevail, the agency's contrary interpretation notwithstanding.
The Supreme Court did not only reverse the Ninth Circuit's
substantive ruling. More importantly, the Court reversed the Ninth
Circuit's holding as to the interaction between Chevron and
precedent. 60 The Court explained:
A court's prior judicial construction of a statute trumps an agency construction
otherwise entitled to Chevron deference only if the prior court decision holds that its
the unambiguous terms of the statute and thus leaves no room
construction follows from
61
for agency discretion.

In other words, if an agency has been delegated the authority
to interpret a statute per Chevron, the meaning of that statute can be
fixed by a court's prior ruling only if that court holds 62 that the statute
is unambiguous-only, that is, if there is no delegation of interpretive
authority to the agency in the first place. 63 Because the Portlandcourt
had not held the terms of the statute unambiguous, its prior decision
did not control the FCC, and the agency's subsequent interpretation
64
was entitled to Chevron deference.
Nowhere in Brand X does the Supreme Court state specifically
whether Chevron's trump of stare decisis applies even if an agency has
already once construed a statute pursuant to Chevron-if the agency
has already had "one bite at the apple"-and then subsequently
sought to amend its interpretation. 65 Indeed, in Brand X the FCC had
never before had the opportunity to offer its own definition in a
judicial proceeding. 66 Nonetheless, it is readily apparent that Brand X
and Chevron will apply regardless of how many prior interpretations
of a statute an agency has already offered, or how many times those
interpretations have been litigated, afforded Chevron deference, and
resulted in judicial validation of an agency's construction. The Brand
X Court displayed full willingness to accept shifts in agency policy as

60. The Court's actions were both predicted and urged two years earlier by Kenneth
Bamberger, though the Court did not cite his seminal article. See Bamberger, supra note 3, at
1293-94.
61. Brand X, 545 U.S. at 982.
62. The question of what constitutes a "holding" that "follow[ed] from the unambiguous
terms of the statute" has already drawn some attention. See Note, Implementing Brand X: What
Counts as a Step One Holding?, 119 HARv. L. REV. 1532, 1536-42 (2006) (suggesting that a
holding satisfies Brand X's condition if and only if the court could not have reached the outcome
it did without concluding that the statute was unambiguous).
63. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229-31 (2001).
64. Brand X, 545 U.S. at 984-85.
65. See supra note 57.
66. Brand X, 545 U.S. at 984-85.

20071

CREDIBILITY OFAGENCY COMMITMENTS

1037

readily as it sanctioned agency overrides of judicial constructions;6 7
after all, "Chevron's premise is that it is for agencies, not courts, to fill
statutory gaps." 68 Brand X replaced a legal regime in which a judicial
decision regarding an ambiguous statute would always entrench that
statute's meaning (whether or not the agency had yet passed on the
statute) into one in which such a decision would never entrench
statutory meaning.6 9 Once a statute has been deemed ambiguous, an
agency forever possesses the freedom to select any "reasonable"
statutory interpretation 70 and, within that interpretation, any non71
arbitrary policy.
II. AN END TO AGENCY CREDIBILITY: THE DELETERIOUS EFFECTS OF
DIMINISHED LEGAL STABILITY

Brand X represents the most recent step in a nearly
unblemished trend towards greater agency flexibility in policymaking.
Undoubtedly, as described above, this shift in many ways augurs
improved regulatory consequences. Agencies will have greater ability
72
to "revis[e] unwise judicial constructions of ambiguous statutes,"
adjust policies and programs to keep pace with the technological and
economic vanguard, and generally exercise more effectively the
expertise that served as the original raison d'&tre for agency
73
delegation.
By eliminating the threat that stare decisis may tie an agency
to a statutory interpretation before the agency is able to exercise the
deference due under Chevron, Brand X will produce other ancillary
benefits. For instance, agencies and courts will no longer be engaged
in a "race to interpret," with the level of deference determined by
whether an agency has an opportunity to undertake the formal
procedures required by Mead before a court has an opportunity to pass

67. Id. at 978-85.
68. Id. at 982.
69. I do not mean to obscure the existence of contrary views regarding the state of the law
prior to Brand X. In the end, agreement as to the precise import of Golden Gate and Neal is not
essential to the principal thrust of this paper. What matters most is the final point made in this
section: at least as of 2005, no judicial decision of any sort can entrench the meaning of an
ambiguous statute.
70. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984).
71. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of the U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S.
29, 41 (1983).

72. Brand X, 125 U.S. at 983. The Court does not mention that agencies will also be able to
revise their own unwise--or simply no longer desirable-interpretations.
73. Sunstein, supra note 3, at 2088.
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on the statutory language. 74 This would seem to be an unalloyed good;
it is difficult to imagine why deference should turn on the vagaries of
litigation timing or the "anomaly" of whether a court or an agency
75
managed to reach the question first.
Among other things, such a shift will allow an agency to
continue to develop statutory interpretations via a case-by-case or
"evolutional approach," 76 rather than having to fear that if it first
undertakes a few, tentative adjudications, instead of a decisive act of
notice-and-comment rulemaking, a court will swoop in and decide the
statutory question before the agency can avail itself of Chevron. An
agency can no longer run out of time to interpret a statute and gain
deference or "use up" its opportunity to do so. Much ink has been
77
spilled in arguing the benefits of greater agency authority generally,
and not surprisingly a preponderance of voices has favored the
78
Supreme Court's moves towards increased administrative flexibility.
Yet scholars simultaneously have overlooked the deleterious
effects that Brand Xs extension of agency flexibility may have upon
both outside parties and the agencies' ability to accomplish their own
regulatory objectives. Brand X adds an element of flexibility-and
therefore instability-to agency authority 79 that is qualitatively
different than the discretion that agencies enjoyed under Chevron and
the other pre-existing doctrines. Before Brand X, a judicial
interpretation of a statute-whether or not that interpretation came
pursuant to a grant of Chevron or Skidmore deference-would
effectively fix the meaning of that statute, binding it in place until
either Congress chose to amend the statute or the court agreed to
overturn its prior holding.
Certainly, as described above, this functioned in many respects
as an unhealthy check on an agency's ability to adjust policy to
changed circumstances. At the same time, though, the judiciary's
ability to settle statutory meaning served as the last resort for outside

74. This situation might arise if an agency were to interpret a statute in the course of an
informal adjudicatory procedure, rather than moving straight to notice-and-comment
rulemaking, and that case were to reach the courts. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S.
218, 229-30 (2001).
75. See Bamberger, supra note 3, at 1299. This is the principal normative justification
offered by the Brand X Court itself. See Brand X, 125 U.S. at 982-83.
76. NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251, 265-66 (1975).
77. See sources cited supra note 3.
78. See, e.g., Bamberger, supra note 3, at 1299-1318; Dotan, supra note 3, at 1004-05;
Sunstein, supra note 3, at 2088. See generally Pierce, supranote 3.
79. This flexibility applies, of course, only in the presence of ambiguous statutory language.
Unambiguous language is construed by the courts at Chevron's Step 1 and remains fixed until
altered by Congress. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
842-43 (1984).
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actors-Congress, regulated firms, and other interested third
parties-seeking some degree of predictability and stability within the
law. Judicial interpretations of statutes-whether pursuant to
Chevron deference, Skidmore deference,8 0 or no deference at alloperated as a very clumsy sort of "safe harbor." Once a question of
statutory interpretation had been decided by a court, outside parties
could assume that the interpretation would remain relatively stable,
alterable only by Congress or a superseding judicial decision, not by
unilateral executive action.8 1 Agencies would still possess the
authority to shift policy.8 2 But their regulatory options would be
confined within the parameters of a single, enduring statutory
interpretation, eliminating the possibility of drastic or broad
adjustments in course that could only be accommodated within a re83
interpreted statutory framework.
This "safe harbor" was undoubtedly a very crude mechanism
for generating regulatory stability. It relied upon the self-serving
decision of a party with standing8 4 to bring an action in court, and
upon the vagaries of the litigation process to bring forth a judicial
decision (and in particular, an appellate decision) from that action.
The process was neither consistent nor predictable, but it did exist.86
Crucially, it could have been adopted by either an interested third
party seeking regulatory stability or an agency that wishes to bind
itself to a particularstatutory interpretation.Indeed, as the following
sections will demonstrate, the value of this mechanism lay in the
agency's power to initiate a legal action that it knew would result in a
constraining judicial decision, thus credibly committing itself to a
given policy.
After Brand X, such a safe harbor no longer exists. At no point
can an agency's statutory interpretation become fixed; neither a court
nor an agency can render an ambiguous statute unambiguous or

80.

United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 234 (2001); Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323

U.S. 134, 140 (1944).

81. Judicial revisions to statutory interpretations will come very rarely. Stare decisis
carries additional weight with respect to precedents interpreting statutes, as Congress remains
at liberty to undo the court's results if it does not agree with them. See Shepard v. United States,
544 U.S. 13, 23 (2005); Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172-73 (1989)
("Considerations of stare decisis have special force in the area of statutory interpretation, for
here, unlike in the context of constitutional interpretation, the legislative power is implicated,
and Congress remains free to alter what we have done.").
82. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of the U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463
U.S. 29, 42 (1983).
83. See supra Part I.A.
84. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992).
85. See supra note 33.
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permanently anchor its meaning.8 6 As long as an agency
interpretation would be entitled to Chevron deference (per the rule set
forth in Mead8"), the agency will always have the ability to advance an
entirely novel interpretation that would override any previous
construction, and to which courts would be required to defer. A
statutory interpretation (and the accompanying policy) will now
remain stable only until an agency undertakes a subsequent
rulemaking to alter them. This permanent instability-a feature
heretofore unknown to the administrative landscape-will powerfully
impact the behavior of Congress and private parties under the post88
Brand X legal regime.
Brand X-and more generally, the absence of any type of
agency safe harbor-is likely to impair the functioning of agencies
with respect to two outside groups: regulated parties (and other
private interests) and Congress. Because of the nature of the
administrative malfunction at issue-agencies' inability to commit
credibly to a particular position-the dilemma sounds in a type of
"contract theory" of administrative law. First, because neither
agencies nor private parties can ever definitively settle or anchor the
law, agencies will have great difficulty persuading private parties to
86. Justice Stevens concurred in Brand X in order to add the caveat that, in his view, an
agency's ability to override a judicial construction of a statute "would not necessarily be
applicable to a decision by this Court that would presumably remove any pre.existing
ambiguity." Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 1003
(2005) (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Stevens, like Judge Kozinski, see supra note 56, thus
seems to believe that there is a point at which ambiguity ceases to exist, and that there are steps
that a court--or at least his court--could take to remove the ambiguity from a statute that was
ambiguous at its inception. It is difficult to see how this view could be consistent either with the
majority holding in Brand X or its broad animating principle that ambiguity is meant as a grant
of discretion to agencies and cannot be usurped by courts. Nonetheless, at least one member of
the Brand X majority has shied away from complete evisceration of the possibility of a statutory
safe harbor that existed before Brand X.
87. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 237 (2001); Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron
Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 191 (2006).
88. The epistemologically radically skeptical stance that the Brand X Court assumes
towards statutory interpretation is worthy of remark. After Brand X, a statute is either
linguistically determinate or permanently ambiguous. That is, neither any measure that a court
can take nor the passage of time can shrink statutory ambiguity. A statute that begins its life
teetering on the edge of ambiguity will remain ambiguous forever. This decision represents not
merely a recognition that statutory interpretation inherently involves policy judgments, see
Sunstein, supra note 3, at 2078, but also a renunciation of the courts' ability to settle a statute's
meaning. Contra Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 867 (1992) ("It is the
dimension present whenever the Court's interpretation of the Constitution calls the contending
sides of a national controversy to end their national division by accepting a common mandate
rooted in the Constitution."); Mesa Verde Const. Co. v. N. Cal. Dist. Council of Laborers, 861
F.2d 1124, 1146-47 (9th Cir. 1988) (en banc) (Kozinski, J., dissenting) ("In settling on a
particular interpretation of a statute, the court is saying: 'This is the meaning that was actually
conferred upon this statute by Congress.' "), replaced by 895 F.2d 816 (9th Cir. 1990). Shyness in
the face of competing political demands is a new posture for the Supreme Court.
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rely on agency interpretations. It is fundamental to contract law that
the consumer of some good may be unable to induce the supplier to
produce if the consumer will not (or cannot) sign a contract agreeing to
purchase the good.8 9 So too might agencies encounter resistance when
attempting to coerce regulated parties to produce "regulatory goods" if
the agency cannot reliably promise that those goods will retain value.
Second, Congress will be chary of delegating too much power to
agencies that it knows can shift their statutory interpretations at any
time in the future-especially after a change in administration-and
regulatory problems that could be profitably addressed through
agency delegations may go unsolved. Moreover, the elimination of any
temporal constraint on agency revisions will transfer some of the
value from any legislative agreement to future executives, making
every bargain less profitable-and less likely-for the parties who
must negotiate it.
A. Third Parties and Induced Reliance
Scholars and courts long have noted the damage that shifts in
regulatory policy may exact upon reliance interests.9 0 Any change in
the background regulatory rules governing an industry is likely to
upset the settled expectations of the firms and interested groups
working in the affected field, leading to disruptions and increased
costs as pre-existing programs become unworkable and new projects
become necessary. 9 1 More importantly, fluid agency interpretations
and re-interpretations make it more costly for affected entities or
other stakeholders to adjust their conduct to conform to agency rules,
and thus regulated actors may refrain from making costly investments
or embarking upon new projects that may be endorsed under one
regulatory regime but prohibited under another one that could be soon
forthcoming.
89.

See CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION 11

(1981).
90. See, e.g., Bamberger, supra note 3, at 1317-18; Dotan, supra note 3, at 1001 & n.19;
Levin, supra note 3, at 1088; see also Smiley v. Citibank, 517 U.S. 735, 742 (1996) ("Sudden and
unexplained change, or change that does not take account of legitimate reliance on prior
interpretation, may be arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion." (citation omitted)).
91. The disruption of settled expectations can affect interested parties whose conduct is not
directly regulated just as it harms regulated industries. For instance, an environmental group
may invest money in beautifying a seashore and opening it to recreational users on the
assumption that nearby industries will not be permitted to discharge certain pollutants, only to
see its investment bankrupted when an agency alters the rule to permit polluting. Cf. Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 568-71 (1992) (finding that an environmental group could
not bring suit because it failed to meet the redressability and causation requirements for
standing) Or it may expend resources to detect violations of a regulation and enforce the rule
against violators, only to have the agency repeal the rule midstream.
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In expanding the policy flexibility available to agencies and
eliminating the possibility of a regulatory safe harbor, Brand X
exacerbates this effect. Because an agency no longer can be bound by
its (or a court's) prior pronouncements, private parties now must
confront a far less predictable regulatory landscape. After Brand X,
there is no passage of time and no formal judicial mechanism that can
entrench a statute's meaning; an agency will always possess
unilateral authority to re-interpret a statute and engage in a
concomitantly significant shift in policy. Without a regulatory safe
harbor, a regulated party is forced into a permanent state of
uncertainty. The party will never enjoy settled expectations and
cannot be certain that future projects will not be frustrated by
significant alterations in the regulatory landscape. This boundless
ambiguity is likely to compel risk- and uncertainty-averse industries
to forego potentially productive investments and lead to avoidable
92
negative outcomes.
Nonetheless, these types of concerns have gained little
purchase. Commentators have correctly noted that private parties
have no right to demand consistency from regulators and protection of
their reliance interests-just as they have no right to make similar
demands upon legislators. 93 This argument has largely overwhelmed
the more modest point that forcing an agency to adhere to prior
94
commitments might, in some cases, simply amount to good policy.

92. See Mark Seidenfeld, Bending the Rules: Flexible Regulation and Constraints on Agency
Discretion, 51 ADMIN. L. REV. 429, 434-35 (1999).
93. See Bamberger, supra note 3, at 1317-18; David M. Gossett, Comment, Chevron, Take
Two: Deference to Revised Agency Interpretationsof Statutes, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 681, 706 (1997).
Gossett claims that "the strongest argument against deferring to revised agency interpretations
is that parties have a right to rely on agency interpretations of statutes" before attacking this
argument on the grounds that "agencies are not courts, and are not subject to stare decisis"; an
agency acts as a "stand-in" for Congress, and of course there is no requirement that Congress
remain consistent. Id.
94. Thomas Merrill has recently addressed similar concerns in the context of the
requirement that agencies adhere to the terms of their own regulations. See Thomas W. Merrill,
The Accardi Principle, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 569, 592 (2006). By contrast, David Gossett's
analysis, described above, overlooks the fact that, even for courts, stare decisis is a "principle of
policy" rather than an "inexorable command." See Gossett, supra note 93, at 693 ("The main
reason for the stare decisis exception is the institutional relationship between Congress and the
courts."). Adherence to prior decisions is motivated by the fact that consistency in the law will
facilitate better private ordering. See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 (1991). There may
be occasions when it is appropriate for courts to press agencies to adhere to prior policies or
statutory interpretations on the theory that change may be socially unproductive. See Sunstein,
supra note 3, at 2104. Sunstein argues that "new departures" from prior agency interpretations
deserve "somewhat less deference than longstanding agency interpretations, for reasons
analogous to those that justify stare decisis in the judicial context," by which he presumably
means reasons relating to reliance interests. Id. The Court has not adopted a similar position.
See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 863-64 (1984) ("[Tlhe
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But what has gone overlooked amidst this back-and-forth is the
importance to agencies and their regulatory missions of the ability to
credibly bind themselves to policies or statutory interpretations. After
Brand X, an agency possesses no mechanism by which it can commit
itself to a statutory interpretation, and so it cannot cajole private
parties into relying upon the stability of a regulation even under
circumstances in which the agency is willing to sacrifice flexibility to
do so.
The well-documented difficulties that arise in private law when
one party cannot credibly commit to a position are equally present
here.9 5 For instance, if a consumer of some specialized good cannot
reliably promise to purchase that good once it is produced, the
manufacturer may opt not to produce in the first place for fear of
losing its investment. Firms overcome this problem by writing binding
contracts that guarantee either a market for a good or damages for
breach. 96 In parallel fashion, if an administrative agency cannot
commit to a particular set of regulations, regulated industries may
refrain from making investments or taking other actions whose value
is contingent on the existence of that regulatory regime. Yet unlike
private firms, agencies now lack broad-based commitment
mechanisms.9 7 The result is that the agency's judicially mandated
unlimited flexibility could significantly inhibit the very regulatory
objectives it was attempting to promote by making the agency unable
to persuade a firm to undertake certain socially productive projects.
Consider, for instance, a regulation designed to reduce air
pollution. There are two primary types of methods that agencies
employ to control pollution: command-and-control systems and capand-trade systems. 98 Under a command-and-control apparatus, each
polluter must obtain a permit, and each polluter must abide by an
independent and discrete limitation on how much pollutant it can
release into the air. 99 Pursuant to a cap-and-trade system, the
regulatory agency sets national or regional air quality goals that are
agency, to engage in informed rulemaking, must consider varying interpretations and the
wisdom of its policy on a continuing basis.").
95. See OLIVER HART, FIRMS, CONTRACTS AND FINANCIAL STRUCTURE 73-88 (1995); OLIVER
E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM 163-205 (1985); Thomas C.
Schelling, An Essay on Bargaining,46 AM. ECON. REV. 281, 282-87 (1956).

96.

See generally Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89

COLUM. L. REV. 1416 (1989).

97. Agencies have a few other options at their disposal. See infra Section III.A. For reasons
that will be discussed, however, each of these alternatives is inadequate.
98. See generally A. DENNY ELLERMAN ET AL., MARKETS FOR CLEAN AIR: THE U.S. ACID
RAIN PROGRAM 154-66, 253-96 (2000).

99. See Robert N. Stavins, Vintage-Differentiated Environmental Regulation, 25 STAN.
ENVTL. L.J. 29, 33 (2006).
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measured in terms of the total amount of pollution that all sources
will release and issues "credits" to each polluting source representing
the fraction of that total that the source is entitled to emit. 10 0 Polluters
can sell or trade the credits among one another, with the intention
that lower-cost pollution avoiders will reduce their emissions below
the necessary level and then sell their excess credits to higher-cost
pollution avoiders, thus achieving air quality improvement equivalent
to a command-and-control system at lower cost.101
Imagine now that Congress has passed a statute directing the
EPA to reduce nationwide carbon dioxide emissions "in a cost-effective
manner."10 2 The EPA decides that a cap-and-trade system will best
accomplish this goal and promulgates a rule imposing cap-and-trade
regulation on factories that emit carbon dioxide. This rule might be
challenged in court (by industry or environmental groups), and a court
likely will uphold the agency's statutory interpretation-that a capand-trade system is "cost-effective"-under Chevron. Before Brand X,
regulated parties could then be relatively confident in the stability of
the EPA's rule, and those polluters able to reduce their emissions most
cheaply could begin implementing emissions-reducing technology and
selling their excess pollution credits. But after Brand X there is
nothing to stop the EPA from reversing course and deciding instead on
a command-and-control regulatory regime, as "cost-effective" is likely
a sufficiently capacious phrase to encompass typical permit-based
regulatory systems. In light of this uncertainty, a risk-averse factory
owner might (rationally) choose not to invest fully in emissionscontrolling technologies for fear that if it can no longer trade unused
pollution credits, it will have scrubbed its own smokestacks cleaner
than needed (and at higher cost) with no recompense to the firm. The
agency's inability to bind itself to a policy choice will thus stunt the
success of its own regulatory initiative.
Scenarios in which unsettled expectations may lead to
suboptimal activity on the part of regulated third parties are not
merely a matter of conjecture. Were Chevron itself decided today, this
could very well be the result. Recall that the substantive question at

100. See Robert N. Stavins, Market-Based Environmental Policies, in PUBLIC POLICIES FOR
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 35-55 (Paul R. Portnoy & Robert N. Stavins eds., 2000).
101. See Cass R. Sunstein, The Arithmetic of Arsenic, 90 GEO. L.J. 2255, 2297-99 (2002)
(describing the putative advantages of a cap-and-trade system).
102. This example is only hypothetical in part. In Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438
(2007), the Supreme Court held that the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1), obligates the EPA
to either regulate carbon dioxide emissions as a greenhouse gas or provide an explanation as to
why prevailing scientific uncertainty prevents it from doing so. The Clean Air Act does not
contain the "in a cost-effect manner" language employed here, but it is hardly a stretch to
imagine Congress amending the statute or the EPA interpreting the statute in such a fashion.
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issue in Chevron was whether, per the Clean Air Act, the EPA could
choose to regulate only the total quantity of pollution emanating from
a localized collection of polluting devices-an "industrial grouping"1°3
rather than placing individual limits on each individual polluter.
This "bubble" approach, like the cap-and-trade system described
above, gives regulated parties an incentive to develop and employ lowcost devices that reduce pollution even below the ceilings set by the
EPA. If a firm wishes to alter a factory such that its pollution will
increase, it need not necessarily find offsetting ways of reducing
pollution from that same factory. The firm can accommodate the
increased pollution in one factory by simply reducing pollution from
the factory adjoining it, if it is cheaper to do so; the "bubble" rule
effectively allows polluters to trade pollution among different emitting
entities within an industrial grouping.104
After Brand X, and in a fashion parallel to the move from a
command-and-control system to a cap-and-trade regime described
above, these investments become extremely risky for the firm if it has
no confidence that the rule will remain in place for any length of time.
A return to the prior system of individualized treatment would leave
the firm with one factory that polluted too much and one factory that
polluted "too little," necessitating a costly reallocation of emissionsreducing technologies. Chevron itself demonstrates the transience of
these types of regulations and the risks that firms face when relying
upon them. In August of 1980, at the tail end of the Carter
Administration, the EPA promulgated a regulation that limited the
"bubble" rule to very particular circumstances. 10 5 But that decision
was not to last long. As the Chevron Court explained, "[iun 1981 a new
administration took office and initiated a 'Government-wide
reexamination of regulatory burdens and complexities.' "106 To say
that the Reagan Administration "initiated a ... reexamination" in
1981 is to undersell what took place; by March of 1981, a mere seven
months after the EPA's original interpretation and only two months
after President Reagan took office, the EPA had already proposed a
rule extending the "bubble" approach to all new sources.10 7 That rule
became final in October 1981,108 though of course it was a fait
accompli long before then. 109
103. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 840 (1984).
104. Emission Offset Interpretative Ruling, 40 C.F.R. § 51 app. S (2006).
105. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 857.
106. Id. (citing Emission Offset Interpretative Ruling, 40 C.F.R. § 51 app. S (2006)).
107. 40 C.F.R. § 51 app. S.
108. Id.
109. This time scale belies to some extent the frequent claim that notice-and-comment
rulemaking is inevitably tortuous and costly for agencies to undertake. See, e.g., Jody Freeman,
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The Reagan Administration's new "bubble" rule may or may
not have been the wiser policy;110 more important are its
impermanence and the President's unilateral ability to alter it. After
the Supreme Court placed its imprimatur on this statutory
interpretation in Chevron-and particularly after INS v. CardozaFonsecala-aregulated party could be relatively confident that this
policy would remain stable and could act accordingly in reliance upon
the rule. Now, however, if a similar situation were to arise a firm
would be forced to contemplate the possibility that a regulation would
last only as long as George W. Bush's presidency. An agency therefore
might have a significant amount of difficulty convincing a firm to take
socially productive steps if it cannot guarantee that the relevant
regulation will outlive the current Administration. Such is the
unsettling effect of Brand X's grant of executive authority and agency
flexibility.
The astute reader may by this point be objecting that of course
no policy choice is ever fully permanent. Brand X has not altered
Congress's ability to set a statutory meaning or override an agency
regulation, and after Chevron a polluter could not be certain that
Congress would step in and restore the Carter Administration's old
rule. But congressional action is both costlier (and therefore rarer)
than agency rulemaking, and crucially requires the acquiescence of
the President and both Houses of Congress (or veto-proof majorities in
both Houses). A congressional override of agency policy thus will
require far greater political accord-or a far more substantial political
shift-than simply a unilateral reversal of course. For instance,
Chevron's new "bubble" rule likely could not have passed Congress in
1981 because the Democrats retained a majority in the House of
Representatives after the 1980 elections. 11 2 There may even have been
The PrivateRule in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 639 (2000); Jonathan T. Molot, An
Old JudicialRole for a New Litigation Era, 113 YALE L.J. 27, 108 (2003); see also supra note 34.
The Reagan Administration decided quite quickly that it intended to overturn the previous new
source rule, and adhering to the procedural formalities of a rule-making required only a few
months. Even the protracted litigation that resulted lasted less than three years-and obviously
very few agency actions reach the Supreme Court. (The Court of Appeals had rendered an
opinion in August of 1982, less than a year after the publication of the final rule. See Natural
Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Gorsuch, 685 F.2d 718 (D.C. Cir. 1982), rev'd sub nom. Chevron, 467
U.S. 837). There are indications that an aggressive agency, empowered with substantial legal
flexibility, can undertake informal rulemaking with reasonable alacrity.
110. See RICHARD A. LIROFF, REFORMING AIR POLLUTION REGULATION: THE TOL AND
TROUBLE OF EPA's BUBBLE 97-103 (1986); THOMAS H. TIETENBERG, EMISSIONS TRADING: AN
EXERCISE IN REFORMING POLLUTION POLICY 188-202 (1985); Sunstein, supra note 3, at 2084.
111. See supra note 24.
112. See THE DIRKSEN CONGRESSIONAL CENTER, CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS ARE WORTH
THE TIME AND ATTENTION, http://www.congresslink.org/printlpelectionsim-worth.htm
(last
visited Mar. 25, 2007) (discussing the importance of Congressional elections in affecting history,
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a majority in both Houses that favored overturning the rule, though
this is more doubtful. In any case, the point is academic; having been
delegated the authority to enact a new source rule, the President
would have used his veto power to avoid surrendering it.113
B. Congress and the Future of UncertainDelegations
Chevron and its progeny are typically understood to transfer
power away from politically unaccountable courts and towards more
democratically attuned executive agencies. More importantly, the
court's deference doctrines also effectuate a transfer of power from
Congress to the executive. Courts are political actors whose ideological
commitments influence their decisions-including their statutory
interpretations. 114 Nonetheless, courts' stated objective when
construing laws de novo is to carry out the will of Congress as
expressed through the language of the statute.11 5 All else being equal,
courts that attempt to find the "best interpretation"' 1 6 will arrive at a
result closer to Congress's preferences than courts that defer to any
reasonable agency interpretation in the presence of statutory
ambiguity.1 1 7 By establishing a default rule that transmutes statutory
ambiguity into executive authority,' 1 8 rather than merely attempting
to ascertain Congress's most likely intent (or the best reading of the
statute), the Court has placed its thumb firmly on the President's side
of the scale.
Courts have accommodated this transfer of power from
Congress to the President by tying the grant of deference to Congress's
and noting that "Ronald Reagan was able to pass his economic program" because of the
"congressional elections of 1980 that gave the Republicans a majority in the Senate and
increased their numbers in the House.").
113. See infra Part III.B.1.
114. See Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, Do Judges Make Regulatory Policy?: An
Empirical Investigation of Chevron, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 823, 825-26 (2006) ("Whatever Chevron
may say, the data reveal a strong relationship between the justices' ideological predispositions
and the probability that they will validate agency determinations."); Richard A. Posner,
Foreword:A PoliticalCourt, 119 HARV. L. Rev. 32, 40 (2005).
115. See, e.g., Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 570 (1982) ("Our task is to
give effect to the will of Congress, and where its will has been expressed in reasonably plain
terms, that language must ordinarily be regarded as conclusive." (citation omitted)).
116. See Atl. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Comm'r, 523 U.S. 382, 389 (1998) ("Since the term 'reserve
strengthening' is ambiguous, the task that confronts us is to decide, not whether the Treasury
Regulation represents the best interpretation of the statute, but whether it represents a
reasonable one.").
117. After all, an agency will not likely be concerned with adhering to the best interpretation
of Congress's intent. Rather, the executive (and therefore the agency) is likely to simply select
whatever policy best matches its own preferences and comports with a reasonable interpretation
of the statute.
118. Elizabeth Garrett, Legislating Chevron, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2637, 2638 n.6 (2003).
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explicit or implicit intent. 119 The Supreme Court most prominently
made this move in United States v. Mead Corp.,120 Chevron's successor
case. After Mead, a court will decide whether or not to award Chevron
deference to an agency interpretation by asking whether Congress
appears to have intended that the court defer to the agency's
reasonable interpretation. 12 1 Yet the Mead rationale is little more
than a legal fiction. 22 Congress rarely (if ever) provides an explicit
statement of its actual intentions.
In the shadow of this legal fiction lies the genuine judgment
widely acknowledged to be at the heart of Chevron and Mead, viz.,
that statutory interpretation involves political and policy choices that
agencies are far better equipped-as a matter of institutional
competence-to make than courts.' 23 Support for Chevron thus rests
on the belief-likely correct-that this doctrine of judicial deference
will lead to better regulatory outcomes overall, the transfer of power
1 24
from Congress to the President notwithstanding.
However, Brand Xs elimination of any judicial safe harbor
exacerbates the already arduous task facing Congress if it wishes to
maintain control over administrative action. The effect may well be to
25
stunt congressional policymaking-to ossify the legislative process.
Beyond even attempting to write less ambiguous statutes, Congress
may refrain from legislating at all in certain areas for fear of
119. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984).
120. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
121. Id. at 229.
122. See William R. Anderson, Against Chevron-A Modest Proposal, 56 ADMIN. L. REV. 957,
963 (2004) ("Few believe, however, there is any actual intentional delegation in these cases-we
are dealing instead with a convenient fiction."); David J. Barron & Elena Kagan, Chevron's
Nondelegation Doctrine,2001 SUP. CT. REV. 201, 203 (2001) ("Given the difficulty of determining
actual congressional intent, some version of constructive-or perhaps more frankly said,
fictional-intent must operate in judicial efforts to delineate the scope of Chevron."); Stephen
Breyer, JudicialReview of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 363, 370 (1986) ("For
the most part, courts have used 'legislative intent to delegate the law-interpreting function' as a
kind of legal fiction."); Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Why Deference?: Implied Delegations, Agency
Expertise, and the Misplaced Legacy of Skidmore, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 735, 737 (2002); Ronald M.
Levin, Mead and the Prospective Exercise of Discretion, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 771, 792 (2002);
Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretationsof Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511,
517 ("[A]ny rule adopted in this field represents merely a fictional, presumed intent, and
operates principally as a background rule of law against which Congress can legislate.").
123. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865 ("Judges are not experts in the field, and are not part of either
political branch of the Government."); Dotan, supra note 3, at 1022 ("Agencies are preferred to
courts since they have expertise, and are politically accountable, and the resolution of
ambiguities in statutes is often as much a question of policy as a question of law.").
124. See Sunstein, supra note 3, at 2102-03 ("[B]ecause of their fact-finding capacities,
electoral accountability, and continuing attention to changed circumstances, agencies are far
better situated than courts to soften statutory rigidities or to adapt their terms to unanticipated
conditions.").
125. Cf.BREYER, supra note 34, at 48; McGarrity, supra note 34, at 533.
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conferring too much flexible authority upon present and future
agencies.
In the sections that follow I adopt the model of legislative
interaction between Congress and the President employed by David
Epstein and Sharyn O'Halloran in their empirical study of legislative
delegation, Delegating Powers.126 According to this model, the
President and all Members of Congress are self-interested political
actors, organized into committees and other leadership structures,
subject to outside pressures from interest groups and constituencies,
and possessing non-isomorphic preferences-principally among them
the desire for re-election-that they seek to satisfy. 127 Any given piece
of legislation will involve some distribution of costs and benefits, and
each legislator will seek to allocate those costs and benefits according
to the legislator's own preference function. 128
Administrative agencies-and here I focus on executive-branch
agencies, rather than independent bodies such as the FCC or Federal
Reserve Bank-are substantially under presidential control. 129 There
are undoubtedly agency costs that complicate the President's ability to
impose her will upon the administrative apparatus, but (following
Epstein and O'Halloran) I treat executive-branch agencies as
mimicking the President's preferences.
Members of Congress legislate under conditions of uncertainty,
both as to the expected outcome of any policy choice and as to which
policy will best satisfy their individual preferences. In the presence of
this uncertainty, Congress faces a "make or buy" decision akin to the
choice that confronts private firms: Congress may elect to invest in
information and decide upon the best policy course of its own accord,
or it may choose to delegate the decision to an executive-branch
administrative agency. 30 Congress's choice of policymaking forum
thus will depend on the comparative resources available to it and to

126. See generally DAVID EPSTEIN & SHARYN O'HALLORAN, DELEGATING POWERS:
TRANSACTION COST POLITICS APPROACH TO POLICY MAKING UNDER SEPARATE POWERS (1999).

A

127. See generally id.

128. That is to say, legislators are likely to support legislation that promises far greater
benefits than costs, while support for legislation that offers relatively balanced costs and benefits
is likely to depend substantially upon the distribution of those costs and benefits. For another
similar-and largely consistent-model of legislation and inter-governmental interaction, see,
e.g., Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congress is a "They," Not an "It" Legislative Intent as Oxymoron, 12
INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 239, 241-49 (1992).

129. See Elena Kagan, PresidentialAdministration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2252 (2001).
130. See EPSTEIN & O'HALLORAN, supra note 126, at 7-8; cf. Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of
the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 388, 393-94 (1937).
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the executive, and will rest ultimately on how members believe that
131
they can best satisfy their own political preferences.
With respect to statutes that delegate power to an
administrative agency, the relationship between Congress and the
executive functions as a type of two-stage game. At the first stage,
Congress and the President negotiate a statute delegating power to an
agency. 13 2 Congress and the executive are essentially agreeing upon a
contract. Each may have particular policy preferences or goals that it
wishes to accomplish, and each would prefer a certain range of
legislative outcomes to the status quo. If there is any overlap between
these ranges, then there exists at least one legislative solution that
133
each side would prefer to the (no legislation) status quo.
At the second stage, the executive branch-via the agency
administrator-interprets the statute and undertakes the concomitant
policy. 1 34 Congress's negotiations with the President at stage one thus
occur within the shadow of the President's subsequent authority over
the statute at stage two; as Congress bargains with the executive it
must consider the interpretation that the administration will likely
attach to the resultant legislation. 135 Consequently, Congress will be
more likely to pass broad agency delegations when its policy interests
are well-aligned with the President's-that is, when it can reasonably
expect the agency's subsequent gloss on the statute to comport with
and further Congress's own preferences-and less likely to confer
uninhibited authority when its interests diverge from those of the

131. Legislative delegations that designate the executive branch as the locus for policy will
also have the effect of transferring both credit and blame for eventual outcomes away from
Congress, and thus may be additionally attractive or unattractive for that reason.
132. In the interests of simplifying even further, for present purposes I will use "Congress" to
denote the legislative branch in its entirety, though of course that branch negotiates policy at the
level of the law-making body, the party, or even the individual member.
133. I put to one side possibilities of log-rolling, vote-trading, and other mechanisms for
reaching agreement when one side may prefer the status quo to the legislation under
consideration. A more complicated picture of voting and legislative preference would only
strengthen the argument here.
134. I do not mean to imply that one necessarily precedes the other; it is entirely likely that
typical agency practice is to interpret statutes to fit whatever policy choice has already been
made. The analysis is independent of this question.
135. Cf. Rachel Brewster, Rule-Based Dispute Resolution in International Trade, 92 VA. L.
REV. 251, 263-68 (2006) (discussing a similar model in the context of international trade law).
This, of course, requires that Congress be aware of Chevron and understand the interpretive
power that it confers upon the executive. This fact has by no means been uncontrovertibly
established, but there is at least reasonable anecdotal evidence to support it. See Garrett, supra
note 118, at 2656-57; Victoria F. Nourse & Jane S. Schacter, The Politics of Legislative Drafting:
A Congressional Case Study, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575, 601 (2002) (surveying staff members on the
Senate Judiciary Committee).

2007]

CREDIBILITY OFAGENCY COMMITMENTS

President. 136 Rigorous
137
expectation.

empirical

testing

has

borne

1051

out

this

1. Legislation Under Conditions of Uncertainty
After Brand X even a Congress blessed with a felicitous
executive will be wary of very broad delegations of power. Any
favorable interpretation by the current executive can be just as easily
undone by a subsequent administration. The eventual result of any
congressional delegation-over any time frame longer than the tenure
of the current administration-will be uncertain. Congress will, in
essence, be placing bets not only on the current executive, but on the
138
entire universe of possible future executives.
The difficulty for Congress is that its power to influence
regulatory policy is asymmetric in the face of variations in
administrations. Congress needs only a simple majority to pass
legislation favored by the current executive, but if a subsequent
administration wrenches policy in a disfavored direction, Congress
will need a two-thirds majority to re-establish control. This increases
both the risk to Congress that a delegation will go substantially awry
and (by a dramatic margin) the uncertainty 139 that Congress will face
in attempting to predict outcomes from putative legislation. In turn,
risk aversion 140 and uncertainty aversion1 41 will weigh upon members
of Congress and bias their preferences against further agency
delegations. As long as a sufficient number of members (or sufficiently
136. See generally EPSTEIN & O'HALLORAN, supra note 126.
137. See id. at 75.
138. Note that the first agency interpretation of a statute will occur relatively early in the
life cycle of a regulation's promulgation and defense in court. Under the Chenery doctrine, an
agency may only defend its actions in court with reference to rationales-including statutory
interpretations-that the agency relied upon earlier in the administrative process. See SEC v.
Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196 (1947) ("[A] reviewing court, in dealing with a determination or
judgment which an administrative agency alone is authorized to make, must judge the propriety
of such action solely by the grounds invoked by the agency."). An agency's definitive statutory
interpretation will thus come to the fore not when an appellate court hears a challenge to a
regulation, or even when the agency is first sued, but when the agency first offers a proposed
regulation for notice and comment. When litigation served to "lock in" this initial interpretation,
as it did before Brand X, Congress could be relatively certain as to which administration would
be engaging in the act of statutory interpretation. After Brand X, this early agency
interpretation is of course non-binding on future administrations.
139. See generally FRANK H.

KNIGHT,

RISK, UNCERTAINTY,

AND PROFIT

19-21

(1933)

(discussing the differences between "risk" and "uncertainty").
140. See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Behavioral Law and Economics: A Progress Report, 1
AM. L. & ECON. REV. 115, 131-35 (1999) (discussing risk aversion).
141. See Daniel Ellsberg, Risk, Ambiguity and the Savage Axioms, 75 Q.J. ECON. 643, 656-69
(1961); see also Dotan, supra note 3, at 1003; William Samuelson & Richard Zeckhauser, Status
Quo Bias in Decision Making, 1 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 7, 7-11, 33-41 (1988) (discussing the
"status quo bias").
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well-placed members) prefer the status quo to a regulatory policy
administered by a President of the other party, uncertainty may
diminish the production of useful legislation.
Rather than refraining entirely from legislating, Congress may
choose to make policy through very limited tax programs instead of
regulatory delegations. 142 Congress undoubtedly makes such choices
for a number of reasons, but among them is the fact that tax programs
provide the executive branch with far less flexible authority.1 43 There
is no invitation to craft more effective or innovative policy solutions;
the IRS is expected simply to enforce the program's particulars, and
indeed the agency sees its primary mission generally as tax
enforcement, not the creation of new policy. The tax program thus
serves as one method by which Congress can implement its chosen
regulatory policy when its preferences diverge from those of the
144
executive.
If there is an extant social problem that calls for a solution, a
tax program will in most cases be preferable to congressional inaction.
But tax programs are decidedly inferior to administrative delegations
along a number of important dimensions. Congress delegates
authority to agencies in order to take advantage of their comparative
advantage in policymaking, or to reach compromises and craft
solutions that would not be politically feasible for Congress to
undertake on its own.1 45 A tax program accomplishes neither of these
things-it is the best solution that Congress can fashion on its own,
delegating only enforcement authority, not decisional authority, to the
executive branch. By driving Congress to substitute crude tax
programs for administrative delegations, Brand X may have the
opposite effect than presumably was intended, robbing agencies of the
flexibility to design workable policy and depriving the government of
its most potent source of regulatory expertise. Whether Congress
chooses the status quo or a tax program as a substitute for an agency
142. See David A. Weisbach & Jacob Nussim, The Integration of Tax and Spending
Programs, 113 YALE L.J. 955, 955-67 (2004).

143. See David A. Weisbach, Tax Expenditures, PrincipalAgent Problems, and Redundancy 7
(Olin Working Paper No. 299, 2006), availableat http://ssrn.comlabstract_id=912735 (last visited
Mar. 25, 2007).
144. Cf. John D. Huber & Charles R. Shipan, Politics, Delegation, and Bureaucracy, in THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 256 (Barry R. Weingast & Donald Wittman eds.,
2006).
145. See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW

131-32 (1980) ("[O]n most hard issues our representatives quite shrewdly prefer not to have to
stand up and be counted but rather to let some executive-branch bureaucrat, or perhaps some
independent regulatory commission, 'take the inevitable political heat.' "); EPSTEIN &
O'HALLORAN, supra note 126, at 9 ("Legislators will prefer to make policy themselves as long as
the political benefits they derive from doing so outweigh the political costs; otherwise, they will
delegate .... ).
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represents a failure of the

2. Externalized Benefits
Worse still, Brand X and the elimination of the last regulatory
safe harbor diminishes the aggregate value to Congress and the
President of passing new ambiguous legislation, narrowing the
window in which the two parties can bargain and lowering the
probability that they will reach agreement on a statute. In a
contractual setting (such as stage one of the previously discussed twostage game), the total amount that both sides have to gain over the
status quo is called the "contractual surplus." To take a very simple
example, imagine a producer ("P') and a consumer ("C') of widgets. P
produces at a cost of $100 per widget, and C desires 100 widgets and
values them at $500 each. A transaction between P and C would
produce a contractual surplus of $40,000 (100 x ($500 - $100)), and if
P and C can locate and agree upon a price that divides this surplus
between the two of them at a transaction cost lower than the value of
the surplus, a deal will result. This surplus is quite large, and the
window for acceptable bargains is equivalently large, so a mutually
beneficial deal seems likely.146
Now imagine that it instead costs P $490 to produce each
widget. A deal between P and C would produce a surplus of only $1000
(100 x ($500 - $490)). Under these circumstances, a contract is less
likely. P and C may be uncertain as to their precise costs or valuation
(and believe the surplus to be zero), or transaction costs might
overwhelm the surplus. As the contractual surplus shrinks, so too does
the window for bargaining and, correspondingly, the probability of a
147
successful deal.
Similarly, the amount that Congress and the President have to
gain collectively from passing legislation might be thought of as the
"legislative surplus." If the parties can locate a point of accord that all
prefer to the status quo, and if the costs of negotiating legislation do
146. With a spectrum of acceptable options the parties to the negotiation must still select
some point within the range that will satisfy both sides (but might favor one or the other)-this
is known as the "bilateral negotiation" problem, and is the source of additional costs to the
negotiation. Cf. Robert Cooter, The Cost of Coase, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 23 (1982) (suggesting
that the battle over how to divide a contractual surplus-and the negotiation costs that would
result-may sometimes prevent parties from reaching agreement, even when there are net
benefits to be realized from doing so).
147. Richard H. McAdams, Group Norms, Gossip, and Blackmail, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2237,
2274 (1996) ("Obviously, the outcome depends in part on the size of each transaction cost relative
to the corresponding contractual surplus-there being no gains from trade if the former exceeds
the latter.").
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not overwhelm the benefits the parties expect to derive from it, then a
successfully passed statute will likely result. The broader the range of
preference overlap-in other words, the greater the legislative
surplus-the more room there is for agreement, and thus the likelier it
is that Congress and the President will find a workable solution.
Consider Congress's and the President's preferences as intervals on a
linear scale. 148 (The scale represents any one of the tradeoffs that are
typical of legislation, and each branch's true preferences is a
combination of n of these linear intervals arrayed in n-space.) In
Figure 1 below, the shaded interval within the linear scale represents
a hypothetical range of options that branch of government prefers to
the status quo-the range in which that branch would be willing to
strike a deal. The overlap between these ranges is the available
bargaining window; and the larger the overlap, the greater the chance
that Congress and the President will reach agreement on legislation.

Figure 1: Baseline Congressional-Executive Negotiation Interval
Congress:

President:

Agreement:

As in any contractual situation, the size and distribution of this
legislative surplus may be affected by the background legal rules
governing the bargain between Congress and the President. By way of
illustration, consider the impact of Chevron. Compared with the legal
regime that preceded it, Chevron transfers some interpretive authority
148. For a discussion of the power of a one-dimensional model and the differences between
one-dimensional and multi-dimensional legislative constructs, see EPSTEIN & O'HALLORAN,
supra note 126, at 54 n.1.
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(and therefore some value) from Congress to the executive, because
the President will gain the benefit of Chevron's default rule when the
statute is interpreted. Congress will require some corresponding
recompense for this loss of control over policy. Thus, after Chevron,
one would expect Congress to demand a better bargain from the
executive on the substantive terms of any statutory delegation. But
this should not necessarily make it more difficult for Congress and the
President to reach agreement on legislation. Congress and the
President are still able to capture all of the benefits from enacting a
statute: The element of interpretive control that Congress losesbecause a neutral arbiter is no longer attempting to determine its
most likely intention-is transferred part and parcel to the President,
who reaps its full benefit. In other words, the executive and the
legislature remain collectively able to internalize the full "legislative
surplus," and so the two parties still will have the same range of
freedom to negotiate and settle upon on a workable compromise, 149
150
with or without Chevron as a background rule.
Unlike with Chevron, what Brand X appropriates from
Congress is not bestowed upon any current President. By eliminating
the settling function of judicial interpretation, Brand X transfers
power to a future executive who can later reverse an agency decision,
and thus decreases the value of any legislative bargain to the current
President and Congress who must negotiate it. Faced with the loss of
some interpretive stability, Congress is likely to demand
compensating concessions from the executive. Yet Brand X confers
only very minimal additional benefit upon the current President. The
vast majority of this newfound policy flexibility and interpretive
authority is captured by future executives who may not agree with the
contemporary administration's choices. The current President is
unlikely to be interested in the fate of subsequent administrations and

149. The distribution of benefits between Congress and the President may change,
depending on their relative negotiating strengths and situations.
150. It is possible that Chevron may lead to a slight decrease in value due to the fact that the
President and Congress will have difficulty valuing their respective loss and gain in interpretive
control, especially when compared with the more certain (and more familiar) pre-Chevron system
of judicial interpretation. Uncertainty in valuations can lead to difficulties in negotiations as
risk-averse parties seek to avoid unknown outcomes or insure-in this case, by adhering to the
status quo-against significant losses. Cf. Douglas G. Baird & Donald S. Bernstein, Absolute
Priority, Valuation Uncertainty, and the Reorganization Bargain, 115 YALE L.J. 1930, 1935
(2006) (stating, with respect to the law of bankruptcy, the similar proposition that "uncertainty
inherent in valuing a large corporation in financial distress creates a bargaining dynamic that
accounts for many of the puzzling departures from absolute priority that the standard model
cannot explain").

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

1056

[Vol. 60:4:1021

so will not value Brand Xs transfer of authority to any appreciable
degree.151
The elimination of any interpretive safe harbor will thus
reduce the legislative surplus that the governmental parties to a
statutory negotiation are capable of internalizing, as some of the
benefits (in policy flexibility) will accrue to these non-party future
executives. A smaller legislative surplus tightens the window for
successful bargaining and diminishes the probability that the parties
will succeed in passing legislation. 152 The result of this accumulation
of costs will likely be less legislative delegation, and agency
ossification of a different kind: rather than courts tying agencies in
knots, Brand Xs version of deference may discourage legislatures
from passing legislation that enables agencies to implement policy
solutions in the first place. Per the same graphical representation,
Brand X will narrow Congress's range of acceptable statutory
outcomes, thereby constricting the domain of overlap between
Congress and the President and diminishing the possibility that they
will come to a successful accord on new legislation. Figure 2 illustrates
this effect:
Figure 2: Reduced Negotiation Interval After Brand X
Congress, after Brand X:

President:
I

w

o

I

Reduced window of agreement:

151. The current President may even dislike the fact that future executives will be able to
alter his interpretation of an administrative statute and thereby undo his legacy. Consequently,
the President may demand a better substantive bargain from Congress (though he will be loath
to forego the statutory ambiguity that would allow him the flexibility to make policy according to
his preferences), narrowing the range of acceptable options even further and making agreement
even less likely.
152. Cf. McAdams, supra note 147, at 2274 (stating that asymmetry in transaction costs can
lead to inefficient results (excessive silence), using a private market for blackmail as an
example).
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Time Horizons and Congressional Defenses

At least three possible objections to the foregoing analysis
immediately present themselves. Members of Congress may have
extremely high discount rates and ignore the long-term consequences
of agency delegations, no matter how uncertain. This would render
future agency flexibility essentially irrelevant to their present
calculations. Congress may also shift to less ambiguous statutes as a
way of reasserting control, rather than refusing to delegate entirely.
Or Congress may simply remove Chevron (or Brand X) deference
directly.
a. Discount Rates
It is conceivable that members of Congress have very short
time horizons or very high discount rates. If members do not expect to
be in office for long stretches of time or if their own futures are
sufficiently murky, then the actions of future administrations will play
only minimal roles in their calculations. 15 3 However, many members
serve for far longer than one presidential term.1 54 During the 109th
Congress, which spans the years 2005-2007, the average House
member was serving her sixth term, corresponding to more than ten
years in office.' 55 The average Senator was in the middle of her third
term, indicating a term in office of twelve to eighteen years. 156 The
average lengths of service in both Houses of Congress are thus already
equivalent to at least three presidential terms, and Congressional
tenure has been rising over the past century and will likely continue
57
to increase.
In addition, the most powerful members of Congress,
committee and subcommittee chairmen and members of the party
leadership-those whose votes are most important to the passage of
legislation, particularly broad agency delegations-are likely to have
153. See generally David Laibson, Golden Eggs and Hyperbolic Discounting, 112 Q.J. ECON.
443, 446-47 (1997).

154. The following discussion assumes that Members of Congress cease to care substantially
about the results of their legislation once they leave office. This is by no means necessarily the
case, and ongoing preferences post-departure would only strengthen the argument made here.
155. ROGER H. DAVIDSON & WALTER J. OLESZEK, CONGRESS AND ITS MEMBERS 32 (10th ed.

2006).
156. Id.; see also CSPAN.ORG, THE 108TH CONGRESS: A PROFILE,

http://www.cspan.org/

resources/fyi108 profile.asp (last visited Mar. 25, 2007) (describing similar tenure lengths for
members of the 108th Congress).
157. See DAVIDSON & OLESZEK, supra note 155, at 32. The average number of terms served

in the House of Representatives from 1789 to 1901 was 2.1; from 1901 to 1995 was 4.8; from 1995
to 2005 was 5.3; and from 2005 to 2007 (the 109th Congress) was 6.2. In the Senate, those figures
are 1.5, 2.2, 2.6, and 3.0, respectively. Id.
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even longer tenures (and greater expectations of remaining in
office). 158 It is the amassing of seniority via length of time in office that
entitles these members to hold important posts in the first place. 159 In
sum, members of Congress are already likely to have sufficiently great
time horizons and sufficiently small discount rates. As the average
tenures of officeholders increase, their time horizons likely will
lengthen and their discount rates should be expected to shrink, as
well. Thus, these members will care greatly about the actions of future
presidential administrations and will be stymied by their uncertainty
about future presidential treatment of statutory delegations.
b. Unambiguous Statutes
Congress always retains the power to erase potential
uneasiness about future executives' treatment of agency delegations
by drafting more highly specified statutes that leave fewer
ambiguities and less interpretive space to exploit. 160 But this process
will be costly; Congressional delegations of power are analogous to
incomplete contracts, and only at significant expense can statutory
drafters provide for every conceivable contingency. 16' In addition,
statutes are negotiated at multiple levels: internally within the House
and Senate, between the House and Senate, and between Congress
and the President. The price of unambiguous statutory language,
then, is not merely the cost of drafting it or reaching bilateral
agreement, but also the cost of negotiating it among a multitude of
different parties. As a result, it is not surprising that unambiguous
1 62
statutes are relatively rare.
Though entirely unambiguous statutes may be impossible or
overly costly, Congress might still draft ambiguous statutes that

158. See id. at 196.
159. See id. ("The majority party member with the most years of continuous service on a
committee virtually always became its chairman.").
160. See Garrett, supra note 118, at 2663.
161. See Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law,
113 YALE L.J. 541, 595 (2003) (noting the "conventional view.., that, but for the cost, parties
would write complete contracts.").
162. Miles and Sunstein's data reveal that of the past 84 Chevron cases to reach the
Supreme Court, on only 20 occasions did the Court hold the statutory language at issue
unambiguous. See Miles & Sunstein, supra note 114, at 825. (I thank Tom Miles for his help in
recompiling the data in this fashion.) The drawing of conclusions based on this collection of
Supreme Court cases is obviously fraught with peril, since the sample is heavily influenced by
selection effects. Only certain types of cases reach the Supreme Court (or are even litigated in
the first place), and unquestionably ambiguous and unambiguous statutes are likely filtered out
at lower levels of the process. As a snapshot, though, this figure conveys an approximate sense of
the rate at which Congress is writing statutes that the courts have found unambiguous.
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present a smaller interpretive frame of ambiguity.'16 In theory, then,
even if a court did not find a statute ambiguous at Chevron's Step 1, it
might still cabin agency discretion by ruling an agency interpretation
out of bounds at Step 2.164 In practice, however, courts almost never
decide a case adverse to an agency at Chevron's Step Two; the
Supreme Court has only ruled against an agency once at step two in
the post-Chevron era. 16 5 This is, of course, not to say that ambiguous
statutes do not limit agency discretion in important ways,16 6 but the
numerical predominance of Chevron Step One decisions is a useful
indication of the relative power of unambiguous statutes in
constraining agency actions.
c. Stripping Chevron Deference
Of course, Congress could remove Chevron deference (or Brand

Xs extra-temporal freedom) with respect to a particular agency
delegation (or even across the board); 167 Chevron is merely a default
rule.168 However, undoing this default rule is itself costly, and it is for
this reason that there is every reason to expect that the default rule
will be very sticky in administrative law, just as it is in other
69
contexts.1
Furthermore, a legislature that seeks to strip an agency of

Chevron deference is confronted with a host of unpalatable choices.
The agency could strip deference from an entire statutory delegation-

163. Cf. HANS KELSEN, PURE THEORY OF LAW 351 (Max Knight trans., University of
California Press 1967) (1934) ("[Tjhe law to be applied constitutes only a frame within which
several applications are possible .... ").
164. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-83 (1984)
(describing the two-step formulation).
165. See AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 397 (1999); Miles & Sunstein, supra
note 114, at 823. From 1990 through 2004, circuit courts invalidated EPA and NLRB actions
(Miles and Sunstein chose this subset of cases for its political salience) on eighty-six of 227
occasions; however, only fifteen of these eighty-six invalidations (6.6% of the total cases) came at
Step Two. Id.
166. And again, it is difficult to draw firm conclusions from the data because of selection
biases.
167. Senator Dale Bumpers proposed a similar idea in 1975, advocating full, de novo judicial
review of all agency decisions more than a decade before Chevron. Senator Bumpers argued, not
unreasonably, that "courts would ensure greater fidelity to congressional desires, whereas
agencies would follow the lead of the president or implement their own policy goals
notwithstanding congressional intent." Garrett, supra note 118, at 2670 (citing 121 CONG. REC.
29956, 29957 (1975) (statement of Sen. Bumpers)). The so-called Bumpers Amendment nearly
succeeded in passing Congress.
168. Garrett, supra note 118, at 2638, 2638 n.6.
169. See Robert E. Scott, Is Article 2 the Best We Can Do?, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 677, 686 (2001)
(discussing contracts); Cass R. Sunstein, Human Behavior and the Law of Work, 87 VA. L. REV.
205, 206-07 (2001) (discussing labor-management relations).
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or perhaps even to an entire agency-and risk overinclusively
sacrificing far more agency expertise than is necessary. Or it could
attempt to selectively deny Chevron deference and temporal flexibility
with respect to a few key statutory provisions. The agency would then
be forced to confront both the cost of negotiating these elisions and the
difficulty of predicting in advance precisely which statutory provisions
will turn out to be crucial. Agencies avail themselves of temporal
flexibility and the freedom to shift policies particularly where rapid
technological change makes ex ante judgments about the importance
of certain provisions difficult. After all, it is Congress's inability to
anticipate future regulatory needs that makes delegation attractive in
the first instance. Congress thus will be forced to undertake costly
negotiations to strip Brand X or Chevron deference under conditions of
great uncertainty as to where the tying of agency hands will
ultimately become productive or relevant. Selective denial of deference
will operate as an expensive guessing game. 170 Predictably, Congress
171
has never explicitly stripped an agency of Chevron deference.

Without a mechanism for credibly guaranteeing that a
particular policy will remain stable, administrative agencies will have
difficulty convincing risk-averse industries to undertake investments
that may be necessary to the success of the operative regulatory
scheme. Similarly, Congress may be wary of delegating authority to
agencies when it cannot guarantee that it will know-and can
constrain-how the agency will employ that authority in the future.
Absent a reliable self-commitment mechanism, administrative
agencies may find themselves hamstrung and unable to avail
themselves of the full panoply of regulatory options.
III. TOWARD FLEXIBLE CREDIBILITY
The problems that administrative agencies will face in
attempting to induce reliance, while significant, are not
insurmountable. A number of potential mechanisms exist by which
Congress might empower agencies to make credible commitments to
third parties, including to Congress itself. In the sections that follow, I
170. The solution that holds perhaps the most promise would be for Congress to set a date at
which an agency's Chevron deference expires-at the end of the current presidential term, for
instance. But this solution also carries a number of potentially decisive obstacles, among them
that it will only function with respect to second-term presidents.
171. Courts have, on occasion, discerned indicators within the statutory text that Congress
did not intend for an agency to receive Chevron deference on a particular issue. See, e.g.,
Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 126 S. Ct. 904, 914-15 (2006).
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briefly sketch a thought experiment in which Congress bestows upon
an agency the power to create "permanent regulations," regulations
that the agency cannot alter unilaterally. The discussion that follows
is necessarily incomplete, and significant work remains to be done in
fleshing out the advantages and disadvantages of an administrative
self-binding mechanism. But the permanent regulation may indeed be
a viable alternative to the current state of regulatory uncertainty and
third-party paralysis.
A. An Alternative to Brand X: The Agency Option
The deleterious consequences stemming from Brand Xs
erosion of an agency's ability to credibly commit to a position are not
reversed easily. There is no reliable substitute within administrative
law that produces some element of judicially enforced consistency, and
it will be difficult to recapture the loss of ability to encourage reliance
on the part of private parties and Congress without some method of
legally binding agencies. At the same time, there are good reasons to
bid a final farewell to the pre-Brand X race to interpret ambiguous
statutory language and the stochastic process that led to an underand over-inclusive set of statutory meanings becoming fixed via stare
decisis.
What is needed is a mechanism for agencies to credibly signal
their intention to retain consistent statutory interpretations or
policies, and one that does not rely upon the vagaries of litigation and
the choices of potentially self-interested third parties. To borrow again
from contract law, agencies need an effective, enforceable method for
either contracting with outside parties (including Congress) or
unilaterally signaling that they will adhere to a particular
interpretation (or, at a greater level of detail, to a particular policy).
The former option-a mechanism for writing binding
contracts-might well serve as a complete solution to the reliance
problems of private parties. An agency could simply write enforceable
contracts with regulated industries that provide for the maintenance
of a particular regulatory regime, solving the reliance problems that
might plague, for instance, implementation of a cap-and-trade
system. 172 The Supreme Court has begun moving in this direction,
holding enforceable certain types of contract-like agreements between
regulated parties and the United States. 173 Alternatively, an

172. See supra Part II.A. However, this contracting process could be extremely expensive, if
(for instance) the EPA were forced to separately negotiate the terms of a contract with every
regulated producer of carbon dioxide.
173. See United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839, 843 (1996).
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extremely robust doctrine of regulatory takings might fulfill a similar
role. 174 This approach would require, at minimum, a sea change in
constitutional law, which limits the doctrine of regulatory takings to
situations "where regulation denies all economically beneficial or
175
productive use of land."
Yet, although these approaches might successfully solve the
reliance problem as applied to private actors, it is difficult to imagine
either of them functioning as a successful bargaining mechanism
between executive-branch agencies and Congress. A structural device
that would allow the President and Congress to strike a judicially
enforceable bargain during a legislative negotiation is rather far afield
from traditional constitutional arrangements. A court would likely
view the validity of such an agreement as a non-justiciable political
question, 176 and in this realm of shifting political commitments
enforceability is the sine qua non of credibility. This is not even to
mention the difficulty of setting damages for an agency breach of
agreement with Congress.
But what of the possibility of creating a binding, unilateral
agency signal? Consider as a thought experiment a statute that
permitted agencies to select the option during notice-and-comment
rulemaking of promulgating "permanent regulations," a sub-species of
typical agency regulations. 177 An agency could identify elements of a
"permanent regulation"-certain interpretations of a statute,
particular policy choices, or decisions at any level of precision-as
irreversible and unalterable by the agency once issued, unless struck
down by a court. Alternatively, if an agency promulgated a typical
regulation that it later wished to entrench, it could simply commence
another abbreviated rulemaking to designate chosen portions of the
previous regulation as immutable. If an agency subsequently
attempted to alter a permanent regulation, a court could review the
178
agency's action for consistency with its earlier guarantee.

174. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT
DOMAIN 7-8 (1985).

175. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992).
176. Cf. Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 228 (1993) (discussing nonjusticiable political
questions); City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 182 (1980); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186,
217 (1962); Pac. States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118, 140-51 (1912).
177. I employ the phrase "permanent regulation" to distinguish it from a "final rule," the end
result of notice-and-comment or formal rulemaking. See New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1, 24
(2002).
178. Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule suggest an internal agency voting rule-requiring a
supermajority vote to make certain types of policy changes-as a mechanism by which an agency
might credibly commit to a stable course of policy. Eric. A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule,
Legislative Entrenchment: A Reappraisal, 111 YALE L.J. 1665, 1701-02 (2002) (describing the
benefits to the national legislature of a similar self-binding mechanism). Posner and Vermeule's
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An agency thus would have within its power the ability to
induce reliance by third parties when it deemed that reliance
necessary to fulfill its regulatory goals, as in the "cap-and-trade"
pollution credit example described above. 179 In addition, the very fact
that an agency had the option of making a regulation permanent
would be a useful signal to regulated parties attempting to gauge the
temporal stability of a given rule. For example, an agency's refusal to
make a regulation permanent could rationally be viewed as a sign that
the current administration envisioned modifying the regulation in the
foreseeable future. Moreover, the agency itself would be capable of
engaging this option precisely when it believed that a fixed policy
would facilitate regulatory achievements.18 0 Agencies would no longer
have to fear the haphazard entrenchment of the pre-Brand X world.
1. Permanent Regulations and Inter-Branch Negotiations
The foregoing analysis addresses only the issue of private-party
reliance on regulatory stability. The application of permanent
regulations to the Congress-Executive interaction is not so
straightforward. An agency still could not credibly pre-commit to a
course of action while Congress was drafting and negotiating a
statute. In many cases, an agency will not know if a permanent
regulation is appropriate until it examines the subject matter at hand,
something it cannot do until Congress has delegated it the authority
(and the necessary funds). But because Congress and the President
will be repeat players in the two-stage game of legislating and
interpreting, it is possible that they will be able to come to a socially
productive accord even absent a rigid pre-legislation enforcement
mechanism.
Here is how such a scenario might play out. Once Congress has
taken up a particular issue and effectively has broached the subject of
suggestion depends on a particular agency structure and may not be aimed as comprehensively
as the proposal here, though it is much in the same vein. See id.
179. See supra Part II.A. The agency would simply promulgate a permanent regulation,
thereby guaranteeing some measure of stability for its regulatory initiative, and market
participants could rely upon that guarantee and invest in pollution-reducing equipment without
fear that the pollution credits they create might suddenly lose their value.
180. It is conceivable that two agencies, both charged with the enforcement of disparate
aspects of the same statute, could engage in a race amongst themselves to interpret a key
statutory provision or set a firm policy agenda. This sort of contest could very well have
deleterious consequences. But in this era of "Presidential Administration," in which policy
decisions-especially significant ones-flow predominantly through the President and the Office
of Management and Budget, it is more likely that a centralized decision-maker will exert
ultimate authority over which policy or interpretation will become entrenched and avert any
putative inter-agency competition. See Elena Kagan, PresidentialAdministration, 114 HARV. L.
REV. 2245, 2246-47 (2001).
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delegation, the administration will announce whether it envisions
promulgating a traditional flexible rule or a permanent rule under the
authority Congress is considering delegating. Congress will then
decide whether to pass legislation or refrain from doing so. If Congress
decides to act, the executive then has the option of adhering to its ex
ante promise or breaking its word and promulgating an unfixed
regulation.181
In some instances, the payoffs to Congress from legislating will
be so high or so low that it will decide whether or not to pass a statute
irrespective of the executive's stated guarantee. But on other
occasions, Congress will be willing to legislate if and only if the
President (credibly) promises to promulgate a permanent regulation.
In other words, under these circumstances, the optimal result for
Congress is the passage of legislation followed by the executive
adhering to its promise to promulgate a permanent regulation.
Congress's second-best alternative is to refuse to pass legislation in
the first place if it believes that it cannot rely on the executive to keep
its word. The least attractive outcome for Congress would be to
legislate in reliance on the executive's promise to cooperate, only to
see the executive later refuse to adhere to its promise to tie its own
hands. 182
There are many occasions when a President will view an
unfixed regulation as more valuable than a permanent one-such as
when the President is just beginning her term-while Congress
prefers a fixed regulation. Conversely, there may be occasions when
Congress is willing to delegate authority only if the President agrees
not to promulgate a fixed regulation-if, for instance, it believes that
future executive preferences will likely comport better with its ownand in which cases the President might actually prefer to disregard
Congress's wishes and tie its own hands. In either case, the
President's dominant strategy would be to strike a bargain with
Congress and then defect from her promise.
Figure 3 models the case of a President who prefers a typical
regulation and a Congress that prefers a permanent regulation as an
extensive form game with hypothetical payoffs. After negotiating with

181. Limited evidence already exists to support the conclusion that reductions in uncertainty
can fuel the production of legislation. Epstein and O'Halloran found that Congress was more
likely to pass legislation when the President took a position on that legislation prior to the vote.
See EPSTEIN & O'HALLORAN, supra note 126, at 145. This result suffers from a potential selection
bias, a flaw that the authors readily admit. Nevertheless, it offers some indication of the value of
certainty to legislators.
182. See generally Douglas R. Hofstadter, The Prisoner's Dilemma and Other Tournament
Games (1983), reprinted in DOUGLAS R. HOFSTADTER, METAMAGICAL THEMAS: QUESTING FOR THE
ESSENCE OF THE MIND 715-34 (1985).
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the President, Congress must first decide whether or not to pass
legislation. Assuming that the negotiation is successful (the President
has agreed that the agency will promulgate a permanent regulation)
and Congress legislates, the Executive must then decide whether to
abide by the agreement (permanent regulation) or defect (typical
regulation). The figure describes the hypothetical payoffs to Congress
and the Executive from each of these choices. Similar to the classical
model of a prisoner's dilemma, overall social value is greatest when
Congress and the Executive cooperate; legislation, particularly
18 3
constructively negotiated legislation, is socially productive.
Figure 3: Representation of Hypothetical Two-Stage
Legislative Process
Agency
promulgates
permanetrglto

Congress passes

Congress: 2
Executive: 2

_

Agency promulgates
typical regulation

Congress: -1
Executive: 5

Congress refuses

to pass legislation

Congress: 0
Executive: 0

In a standard game, Congress would comprehend ex ante that
the President's best strategy is to promise cooperation, induce the
passage of a statute, and then defect. Congress would act with this
strategy in mind and would refuse to legislate in the first place,
leading (sub-optimally) to an underproduction of necessary
legislation. 8 4 But Congress and the President are not playing this
game only once. Rather, the two branches of government will engage
in this game repeatedly over the course of the President's term in
183. See JAMES D. MORROW, GAME THEORY FOR POLITICAL SCIENTISTS 78-80 (1994).
184. ANATOL RAPOPORT & ALBERT M. CHAMMAH, PRISONER"S DILEMMA: A STUDY IN
CONFLICT AND COOPERATION 135-40 (1965).
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office, giving Congress the opportunity to punish the President on
subsequent occasions (by not passing valuable legislation on other
topics) if she defects from a promise to cooperate.18 5 As with the classic
iterated prisoner's dilemma, it is possible that the parties will
understand that their interests lie in reaching agreement to the
greatest extent possible, and thus that the parties will achieve an
18 6
equilibrium of continued cooperation-the optimal outcome.
Because of the threat of future punishments, Congress will pass
legislation, and the President will adhere to her prior agreements to
18 7
promulgate permanent regulations.
2.

Alternatives and Safety Valves

The discussion of permanent regulations thus far has described
the agency's option as binary: the agency must choose between
promulgating a regulation that it may modify unilaterally and
creating one that it may never alter. In reality, however, there is
nothing to prevent Congress from offering a menu of entrenchment
options. Agencies might be permitted to select between entrenching a
regulation permanently, fixing it for a term of years, or simply grandfathering some aspect of a regulatory program, such as guaranteeing
the value of tradable pollution credits. This approach would also afford
Congress greater latitude in calibrating an agency's procedural tools
to the markets and technologies over which those agencies have
jurisdiction. For instance, Congress may not have any information
regarding whether or to what extent it is important for the FDA to be
capable of inducing reliance from pharmaceutical companies, but it
might understand in broad strokes that biotechnology advances too
rapidly to justify an administrative entrenchment for longer than five
or ten years. Congress then could limit the FDA's self-commitment
powers accordingly.

185. Alternatively, Congress could simply pass a statute that permits an agency to
promulgate only permanent regulations, writing the binding agreement into the terms of the
legislation. This would have essentially identical effect, largely transforming bargaining costs
into drafting costs. Congress should therefore be able to achieve its objectives using either a
generalized statute (and relying on the President's behavior within the prisoner's dilemma game
theoretic) or particular enactments.
186. See MARTIN J. OSBORNE & ARIEL RUBINSTEIN, A COURSE IN GAME THEORY 16 (1994); see
also DOUGLAS G. BAIRD ET AL., GAME THEORY AND THE LAW 191-95 (1994). There are, of course,

other equilibrium solutions; I mean only to suggest that this is one likely possibility.
187. In typical iterated prisoner's dilemma games with known stopping points, the parties
will rationally defect on the final iteration, as there will be no future opportunity for one to
punish the other. In this type of game, the endpoint will come when the President's term in office
is over. Even then, however, the President will have no incentive to defect-flexibility is
presumably worthless to him if he is about to leave office.
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In addition to the value conferred by the very fact of
proliferating options, a menu of entrenchment possibilities would
possess the virtue-well-known in contract law-of reducing the
transaction costs surrounding agency decisions to commit. Menus
would diminish the costs of negotiating and drafting permanent
regulations1 8 8 and could provide a focal point for selecting the
appropriate length or terms of agency entrenchment.1 8 9
It is worth noting, in addition, that no permanent regulation
can truly be permanent. Agencies are capable only of binding
themselves; they cannot tie Congress's hands as well. This limits the
degree to which any agency entrenchment can successfully induce
private-party reliance, but in many regulatory domains this problem
is not likely to significantly inhibit the effectiveness of permanent
regulations in inducing reliance; legislation is comparatively
protracted and expensive, and Congress acts comparatively rarely.1 90
More importantly, the possibility of Congressional action provides a
safety valve in the event that an administrative entrenchment
becomes cumbersome, out of date, or otherwise suboptimal. If a
permanent regulation's disutility is so evident that both houses of
Congress and the President agree it should be undone, Congress need
only pass a one-sentence law to effect the change.
B. Potential Objections
The foregoing Section described the affirmative case for
empowering agencies to promulgate permanent regulations. The
subsequent sections aim to address the most serious objections to this
approach. Without question, a great deal of uncertainty surrounds the
costs and benefits of this proposal, and much work remains to be done
in quantifying those costs and benefits to some reasonable degree of
precision. Nonetheless, as the following sections illustrate, there is
reason to be optimistic that the benefits that accrue from affording
agencies this option will exceed the harms that may result.

188. YAIR JASON LISTOKIN, JOHN M. OLIN CTR. FOR STUDIES IN LAW, ECON., AND PUB.
POLICY, WHAT Do CORPORATE DEFAULT RULES AND MENUS Do? AN EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION 1-

2 (2006), http://papers.ssrn.com/abstractid=924578 (last visited Mar. 25, 2007). After all, it will
rarely be wise for an agency to entrench itself without entering into consultations with the
relevant third parties that indicate that such entrenchment is necessary or desirable.
189. Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Standardization and Innovation in Corporate
Contracting(or " "The Economics of Boilerplate' '), 83 VA. L. REV. 713, 716-18 (1997); Michael
Klausner, Corporations, Corporate Law, and Networks of Contracts, 81 VA. L. REV. 757, 762-63

(1995).
190. See supra Part II.B.
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1. Administrative Over-Entrenchment
Among the canonical objections to legislative entrenchment is
that it affords "the past too much power over the present."' 91 Such a
concern is similarly present in the context of a mechanism for
administrative entrenchment, though it might be more usefully stated
in instrumentalist terms: a President who seeks to preserve her
legacy 192-- or distrusts the motives or competence of her successormight over-entrench agency regulations, imposing costs on future
generations that she does not internalize. This concern is best
understood as a threat that a President will engage in "eleventh-hour"
entrenchment, locking policies into place on her way out the door, at a
moment when the costs-both political and policy-oriented-would be
at a minimum. Any mechanism for rendering regulations permanent,
then, would seem to threaten a type of administrative self-ossification.
The threat from such an overuse of the entrenchment
mechanism cannot be gainsaid, and subsequent research may be
required in order to place reliable bounds on the magnitude of these
harms. At this point-and particularly in the absence of empirical
data-it is impossible to show definitively that these costs are
negligible. But there remain several reasons to believe that the costs
of over-entrenchment will not overwhelm the benefits.
First, the President's incentives at the conclusion of her term in
office are mitigated in both directions. On the one hand, the President
has the ability to deliver private benefits (such as a permanent
regulation favored by political allies) without incurring the typical
public harm of diminished prospects for reelection. At the same time,
however, the value of these private benefits is itself marginalized-the
President has no remaining political races to run or programs to
promote, and so she cannot extract value from the conveyance of these
private benefits to the extent that she might while a significant term
in office remained. Certainly the President may have ideological
reasons for preferring that a policy remain in place, or she may wish
to use permanent regulations to confer ongoing benefits upon her
successor. But these interests, while potentially substantial, will be
less important than the President's own desire for political survival.
Moreover, the same reputational concerns that might induce a
President to entrench her administrative programs and secure her
legacy will militate against overzealous or overinclusive abuse of
permanent regulations. A President who attempted to ensconce her

191. Posner & Vermeule, supra note 178, at 1673.
192. By which I mean, in functionalist terms, accrue ongoing reputational benefits via the
simple preservation of his projects and programs.
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regulatory achievements at the expense of future generations (and to
the detriment of her duly elected successor) would suffer politically for
the apparent act of hubris. The American public has become quite
adept at exacting a political price for the last-minute actions of an
outgoing President, actions that might heretofore have flown under
the political radar; witness the damage that President Clinton did to
his legacy with a series of eleventh-hour executive pardons 193 that
came to be viewed as self-interested political acts, despite the fact that
such pardons have very little practical negative effect upon the polity.
An ill-conceived permanent regulation that promised to significantly
diminish social welfare would likely be greeted with even greater
disapprobation. 194
Second, unlike with a pardon or recess appointment, 195 a
President could not simply enact a permanent regulation with the
stroke of a pen. Per the terms of this thought experiment, permanent
regulations (or hybrid versions thereof) would require notice-andcomment rulemaking; after all, such regulatory mast-tying is
appropriate only when necessary to induce cooperation from a third
party. Consequently, a President would require some appreciable
amount of time-a matter of months, most likely-before she could
place a permanent regulation into effect. A President could not deploy
this mechanism between November and January, pursuant to the
outcome of a particular election; an agency would need to initiate
regulatory action well in advance of known political results. This
diminishes the potential for abuse quite substantially. It is therefore
little wonder that the prototypical "eleventh-hour" executive actions
are those that the President can undertake unilaterally and
instantaneously.
Third, and perhaps most importantly, this new legal
mechanism would hardly represent the only manner in which one
administration might take significant actions that future executives
could not reverse. 196 Each time the EPA allows a factory to expel some
193. See, e.g., Eric Lipton, Officials Criticize Clinton's Pardonof an Ex-Terrorist, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 22, 2001, at B4.
194. The political price a President might pay for an eleventh-hour action undoubtedly has
much to do with the political salience of that action. The point here is simply that if presidential
pardons, which affect few people and are not typically noteworthy events, can develop
substantial political significance-either organically or through the efforts of interest groups that
seek to use the pardons to their advantage-then surely major regulatory action can capture
public attention to at least the same degree.
195. See HARRY B. HOGUE, CRS REPORT FOR CONG., RECESS APPOINTMENTS: FREQUENTLY
ASKED QUESTIONS 1 (2007), http://www.senate.gov/reference/resources/pdf/RS21308.pdf (last

visited Mar. 25, 2007).
196. Cf. Posner & Vermeule, supra note 178, at 1691-92 (noting that similar dangers exist
irrespective of whether a legislature is empowered to entrench itself).
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pollutants into the surrounding environment, it sanctions an action
that is orders of magnitude more costly to undo than it was to allow.
If, for instance, one president were to allow petroleum companies to
drill in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge and an oil spill were to
occur, subsequent presidents could not nullify the resulting
environmental damage without tremendous expenditures-costs far
outstripping what is required to pass a statute overturning a
permanent regulation. Nonetheless, existing procedural and political
controls are viewed as adequate restraints on an executive's incentives
and ability to take such actions; no one seriously suggests that courts
should tailor their level of scrutiny to the extent to which an agency
regulation will lead to irremediable consequences. We have grown
comfortable with substantively irreversible agency actions; there
seems little reason to discordantly distrust procedural entrenchments
that are merely difficult to invalidate.
Under any administrative scheme, the threat that the
President-or the agencies themselves-will act for their own benefit,
rather than for that of the public, is omnipresent. 97 The possibility of
administrative entrenchment may provide another avenue for an
outgoing President to do harm, but it does not alter this fundamental
calculus.
2. Standard Error Costs
Though an agency in many cases may wield its authority to
bind future incarnations of itself to productive effect, an agency's
decisions may not always prove to be accurate or wise. Indeed, the set
of cases in which an agency elects to promulgate a permanent
regulation may be underinclusive, overinclusive, or both. Instances of
underuse are not properly tabulated as a "cost" of permitting agencies
to promulgate permanent regulations; a "failure" to promulgate a
permanent regulation is functionally equivalent to the state of not
possessing the power to enact one in the first place. Overuse of this
power, on the other hand, may impose costs on agencies, Congress,
and the public if permanent regulations serve to entrench policies that
were either misguided at their inception or have become obsolete. The
previous sub-section considered the more serious threat that agencies
would undertake such action deliberately; here I turn to the possibility
of unintentional errors of overinclusion, or what one might call
"standard" (as distinct from biased) error costs.

197. See generally Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88
HARV. L. REv. 1667, 1670 (1975).
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At time

ti, the agency promulgates a permanent regulation, enacting what it

believes to be the best policy. This judgment, of course, may or may
not be correct. At time t2, the agency revisits this policy and concludes
that it has become outdated, or was unwise when promulgated, or
otherwise should be altered. The error cost from A's actions is the sum
of two factors. First, A might be correct in believing that the
regulation should be altered at t2; the error cost is based on the
difference between the agency's probability of enacting the optimal
regulation at t2 minus the agency's probability of enacting the optimal
regulation at ti-in other words, the gain in information and accuracy
that the agency achieves between ti and t2. Second, the agency might
have been correct at ti, and the regulation simply might have become
obsolete due to the passage of time, in which case the error cost is
driven by the probability that the agency will realize the regulatory
obsolescence at t2. Importantly, error costs are not determined solely
by the likelihood that an agency will seek to alter a regulation at t2;
circumstances must change, or the agency must acquire useful
information in the interim.
Agency attempts to regulate industries and markets
characterized by rapid advancements with permanent regulationsand permanent regulations that operate on the vanguard of
technology-thus hold the possibility of catalyzing significant error
costs if the regulatory terrain shifts quickly. Yet these are precisely
the circumstances under which an agency's expertise is of greatest
value, and in which agencies have the greatest institutional
advantages vis A vis other decisionmaking bodies. Courts and scholars
have moved to provide agencies with increasing policy authority-and
deference-largely because of their perceived capacity to deal with
these types of rapidly changing fields. It would be incoherent to trust
agencies to regulate intelligently but simultaneously view with
suspicion their abilities to discern when it would be appropriate or
beneficial to insert permanent regulations into a transitioning market.
There is thus reason to believe that agencies will enact injudicious
permanent regulations only rarely.
In the event that an agency errs in cementing a regulation that
later becomes obsolete, the agency could attempt to reverse its
mistake by convincing Congress to pass legislation unlocking the
imprudent regulation and restoring the agency's self-sacrificed
flexibility. Thus, the total cost of such an error is equivalent to either
the cost of passing legislation to overturn the permanent regulation or

1072

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 60:4:1021

the loss to society if the agency is unable to convince Congress to
unfasten its regulatory authority.198
The first of these two costs will likely be moderate. Statutes are
unquestionably costly and time-consuming to negotiate and pass, 199
but the statute required to unwind a permanent regulation holds the
virtue of simplicity. Congress need not decide upon a particular policy
or specify particular administrative powers or responsibilities; it need
only vacate the permanency of a regulation already in existence and
restore to an agency the same power it has already delegated. The
predominant procedural costs of passing such a statute will not come
through its drafting and negotiation, but rather through the difficulty
an agency may face in convincing Congress to act in the first
instance-namely the second of these possible sources of loss.
The Administration's ability to convince Congress to free it
from a prior commitment will inevitably depend upon the party
affiliations of Congress and the President, the provenance of the
preexisting regulation, and any number of other political concerns. It
is undeniable that in some instances-and particularly in the presence
of divided government-Congress will simply refuse to accede to an
agency's desire to modify a permanent regulation. 20 0 Yet Congress will
pay a political price at the hands of its own national constituency if it
fails to respond to a perceived need for agency action in the face of an
inoperative regulatory status quo. 20 1 Congressional inaction will not
be lightly tolerated, and thus should not be regularly expected.
In sum, it is impossible to conclude with any great certainty
that the standard error costs stemming from an agency power to
promulgate permanent regulations will be negligible. Consonant,
however, with the trust placed generally in agencies to employ their
delegated authority wisely, the gains that agencies will be able to
achieve via enhanced credibility will, in all probability, dominate the
costs they incur through these standard errors.

198. The President and the relevant agency may not have the proper incentives to expend
sufficient capital convincing Congress to undo a given permanent regulation simply because they
will be unable to internalize fully the benefits from promulgating a new regulation.
199. See supra Part II.B.
200. The issue is exacerbated by the fact that affirmative steps would be required of
Congress, placing third parties with vested interests in maintaining the status quo in the
position of having only to acquire a blocking position in Congress in order to frustrate agency
intentions.
201. See Jide Nzelibe, The Fable of the Nationalist President and the ParochialCongress, 53
UCLAL. REV. 1217, 1254 (2006).
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3. Divided Government
Just as the possibility of demanding an irreversible statutory
interpretation may encourage the legislature to act when its
preferences are reasonably well aligned with the current executive, so
might the threat of a permanent regulation deter delegation in cases of
divided government when executive and legislative preferences are
poorly aligned. 20 2 Broad administrative delegations are rare in times
20 3
of divided government, but they do occasionally take place.
Granting the President the ability to entrench a regulation (and thus
deny future Presidents the opportunity to shape the regulatory
agenda in a fashion more to Congress's liking) might chill what
remained of Congress's desire to delegate to an uncongenial President.
Nonetheless, a number of factors exist that will substantially
mitigate the losses that such a prospect might entail. First, Congress
has the ability to bargain for a "temporary" (traditional) regulation,
much as it does for a permanent one. Pursuant to the same game
theoretic model, the President will comply with Congress's wishes
(particularly in cases of divided government) for fear of discouraging
future delegations.
Second, even if these attempts to bargain fail or become too
costly to be practicable, the threat of unwanted entrenchment will
only discourage legislation when it was unlikely from the start. The
beneficial effects of permanent regulations will exceed their
detrimental impact simply because a proportionate increase of a large
quantity will be greater in magnitude than the same decrease of a
smaller quantity. In more concrete terms: imagine that when
Congress and the Presidency are controlled by the same party and
generally share the same preferences, Congress will delegate
authority to an agency with 60% probability. In an instance of divided
government, Congress may choose to delegate with regard to the same
issue only 30% of the time. Assuming that government is divided half
of the time and unified half of the time, Congress will delegate (on
average) with 45% probability. If an agency's ability to promulgate a
permanent regulation affected the probability of legislation by one
third (increasing it cases of unified government, decreasing when
government is divided), Congress would then be 80% likely to delegate
in times of unified government and 20% likely to delegate when
government is divided, for an overall average 50% probability. The
result will be more delegatory legislation simply by virtue of the fact
that one third of 60% is greater than one third of 30%.
202. See EPSTEIN & O'HALLORAN, supra note 126, at 189.
203. See generally id.
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Third, even if the effect of a permanent regulation in instances
of divided government were identical and congruent to its effect when
legislative and executive preferences are unified, in either case the
permanent regulation would diminish the uncertainty attendant any
legislative delegation. This drop in uncertainty across the boardaccompanied by a decline in risk-would bias the overall outcome in
favor of more legislation, irrespective of the chilling effect on divided
government. Thus, under even these worst-case assumptions the
possibility of promulgating a permanent regulation should exert a
positive force upon the rate of legislative delegations.
4. Unconstitutionality
There exists an obvious parallel between this solution and the
constitutional axiom that "one legislature may not bind the legislative
authority of its successors. ' '20 4 Here, tying the hands of its future self
is precisely what an agency is being empowered-and asked-to do.
But unlike with Congress, whose freedom to act notwithstanding the
actions of previous Congresses is endemic to the constitutional
structure, there is no apparent reason why a current agency should
not be allowed to limit the options of its future selves. 20 5 At the most
basic level, it is certainly the case that 1) Congress can bind an agency
to a specific policy or interpretation, and 2) Congress can delegate
legislative authority to an agency. These two premises alone seem to
compel the conclusion that an agency can be granted the power to tie
20 6
its own hands.
Furthermore, agencies are fully the creations of statutes,
endowed with whatever powers Congress affords them (and nothing
more). If Congress chooses to establish the rules of the game such that
an agency is able to limit its own future policy choices, the agency
cannot be heard to complain that these are unfair existential terms.
Finally, one very practical problem that would arise if one
Congress were able to constrain future Congresses is that no
mechanism-short of a constitutional amendment-would exist for
later voiding those constraints if they were to become unworkable.

204. United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839, 872 (1996) (citing WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
1 COMMENTARIES *90); see also LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 124-25 n. 1

(3d ed. 2000).
205. Some scholars believe that even the axiom prohibiting one Congress from binding future
Congresses should be discarded. See Posner & Vermeule, supra note 178, at 1665.
206. For a slightly longer exegesis on this point, see Doug Geyser, Note, Courts Still Say
'What the Law Is" Explaining the Functions of the JudiciaryAfter Brand X, 106 COLUM. L. REV.
2129, 2160-63 (2006).
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With respect to self-constrained agencies, the solution is much
simpler; all that is required is a subsequent act of Congress.
C. Sourcing the Administrative Option
As the foregoing paragraphs indicate, this solution to Brand
Xs erosion of legal determinism must likely take the form of a
legislative enactment, rather than a judge-made rule. After Vermont
Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC,20 7 the judiciary has little power
to create new procedural mechanisms for agencies out of whole cloth,
and it is difficult to imagine an extant statutory basis for imposing
such a rule. Without question, the efforts of Congress and the
President to pass such legislation will be fraught with the same
difficulties and transaction costs that accompany any legislative
endeavor. But this solution is likely to succeed where others would fail
for two reasons. First, unlike particularized solutions, Congress can
achieve its objective with one simple piece of legislation. It need not
negotiate specialized provisions to accompany specific delegations.
Second, unlike other "one statute" solutions-a statute overturning
Chevron, for instance-this legislative fix is not a crude, one-size-fitsall approach to agency governance that sacrifices adaptability in the
name of legislative convenience. 20 8 Rather, it would provide agencies
with more options and more ways to achieve their regulatory goals,
preserving flexibility and avoiding improper and unnecessary
constraints on agency action.
As with any measure that eliminates some degree of policy
flexibility, this solution would undoubtedly diminish agencies' abilities
to regulate at the very vanguard of technological and economic
progress. From time to time, agencies would find that they had bound
themselves to policies that were no longer optimal and would be forced
to seek new organic legislation from Congress; and legislative
solutions, even widely accepted and approved ones, inevitably are
slower and more costly than unilateral agency rulemakings. But this
type of "legislation-forcing" mechanism has, in other contexts, been
highly valued for its ability to induce political accountability. 209 Cass
Sunstein has suggested that courts, when confronted with difficult
constitutional questions of executive power, should issue legislation207. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519 (1978) (holding that
courts may not append additional procedures to those specified in the statutes governing agency
action).
208. See supra Part II.B.
209. See Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315, 317 (2000) ("The
nondelegation canons represent a salutary kind of democracy-forcing minimalism, designed to
ensure that certain choices are made by an institution with a superior democratic pedigree.").
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forcing decisions that press Congress into service as an authorizing
body, thereby deploying an additional-and superior-political
constraint against potentially injurious executive action. 210 With
respect to executive agencies, the principle is the same.
CONCLUSION

Administrative law-indeed, the entire theory of institutionsis founded upon the notion that particular bodies or groups are better
equipped than others to decide certain types of difficult questions. It is
this philosophy that has formed the intellectual backbone of the
movement towards endowing administrative agencies with evergreater flexibility and freedom, transferring an increasing proportion
of the responsibility for formulating contemporary regulatory policy
from inexpert courts and the ponderous legislature to adroit and agile
agencies.
Yet, as this Article has demonstrated, flexibility-when
conferred without limits-can impair, rather than further, the
effective functioning of the administrative state. It may well be that
courts and Congress could divine when these instances will arise and
act accordingly, if either of them were made the sole repository of the
authority to curb agency flexibility. In accordance with the principles
that underlie administrative law, however, it is the agencies
themselves who are most profitably entrusted with this power.
Agencies are best positioned to evaluate their own need to induce
third-party reliance and to balance that need against the value of
their foregone interpretive freedom, just as they are best positioned to
decide the antecedent scientific and economic questions that
motivated the initial decision to commence regulatory action. It is
perhaps ironic that the solution to an overabundance of
administrative flexibility is to provide agencies with yet another
policymaking tool. Nevertheless, private law theorists have long
understood the value of simply providing parties with greater
numbers of options and allowing them to bargain to optimal results.
Administrative law would do well to incorporate similar wisdom.

210. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME
COURT 4 (1999) (describing the value of legislation-forcing rulings).

